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Foreword
I can no longer count how many times I’ve been asked why an engineer should
move on to studying law. There’s no relationship between the two, people
say, it’s a totally different thing, you have to start over from scratch. What I
say is that it’s true in part, and the master course gains no benefit from my
previous degree, differently from what I’d have had if I had turned to, let’s
say, mathematics. But saying that there’s no relationship between the two
fields is the result of a really short-sighted and approximate point of view.
It all began during my PhD at Scuola Sant’Anna. I can’t say when it was
for certain, but reasonably I’d place it somewhere in late 2004 or early 2005.
There was a seminar by this guy I had never heard of, Alessandro Rubini.
Now, if I were asked who this guy is, I would reply that he’s a very peculiar
person, with huge technical experience. A Linux guru, driver developer, often
called upon by companies that want a Linux driver for a new product. But
more than that, he’s a sort of computer politician. The right-hand man of
Richard Stallman at FSF Europe, together with his boss he’s really involved
in the promotion of free software; but, differently from many Linux fedayyin,
he still maintains that there is a place both for commercial and free software.
This guy came over for a seminar while I was a PhD student, and I
attended. I don’t remember the exact theme of the seminar, but there was a
strong focus on software patents, licenses, actions by the BSA and reactions
by FSF, and so on. Among a lot of chit-chat (because this guy talked a lot
about himself and personal experiences), the seminar had more about legal
issues than technical ones. That’s where it began.
That seminar lit within me an interest in the legal aspects of information
technology. In the following years, my interest grew, while I started following
the news on the subject, be it the “Legge & bit” page on PC Professionale,
or the more law-focused website Punto Informatico. At some point, I felt the
urge to face the matter more seriously.
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When I was finishing my PhD, back in 2007, I asked prof. Giuseppe Lipari,
who was my advisor, to advise me. He gave me the name of another person
in Sant’Anna, prof. Giovanni Comandè, who was a law teacher involved in
technical issues such as electronic signature or certificates. This professor
pointed me towards some masters focusing on what they called “Internet
law”, but after some reading, I realized that these courses were not aimed at
people with an expertise in technological subjects, but in legal ones. Then
I knew what I had to do if I were to collect the knowledge I needed in the
field of IT law.
My second university run was much smoother than the first one. Maybe it
was because I had been forged in a time before university had been simplified;
maybe after a master degree and a PhD I was very skilled in studying; or
maybe - just maybe - studying law is really easier than engineering. Whatever
the reason, in the end I managed to have very good results while also working
as a researcher, and taking plenty of time for having fun. All in all, I’d say
that studying law has only been a matter of time and money to me, with
little brain effort.
My choices over the years were compliant with my initial intentions, both
when selecting exams and when defending theses. My bachelor thesis was
on copyright, specifically on the “fair compensation for private copies”, a
small fee which is almost no longer talked about but contributes a lot in
replenishing the budget of rights-collecting societies. In my master thesis,
I ended up going back to where it all began, to prof. Comandè, working
on one of those “technical issues” he is involved to. And it all seems so
obvious now, thinking that copyright and privacy are simply the two most
controversial fields regarding law in the information society, those the new
businesses revolve around, where the interests of large companies are pitted
against those of individuals.
Cesare Bartolini
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Introduction
“Privacy” is an often-misused term. When the concept made its first appear-
ances in law, more than one century ago, it was used properly, because it
was connected to the term “private” as opposite to “public”. In other words,
privacy meant the freedom of an individual to stay away from the public, to
cut unwanted people off from his or her affairs, a right to self-determination
not undermined by external intrusions. Privacy was characterized with some
degree of physicalness, since these intrusions often happened on a material
context as well, such as invading the person’s house or taking pictures of
someone in a hotel room.
Many changes have occurred since then. Many, and at an ever-increasing
speed. Over time, the intrusions to privacy have overstepped the boundaries
of the material world, and through a series of adaptations they reached a
totally different meaning. From a context where individuals with some degree
of public notoriety were protected against intrusion and disclosure of private
facts, privacy today means the protection offered to any individual against
unauthorized processing (with a very wide meaning of the term) of his or
her personal data. The basic purpose of the protection remains the same:
endorsing individuals with a control over what, and by whom, is known about
them. But the content and the recipients of this protection are drastically
different from the original concept of privacy. The term is still used for
practical and historical reasons, but the modern concept is more related to
data protection than privacy. “Classical” privacy, of course, retains its place
as the most obvious part of the protection, and a very important one: the
existence of an interest not to be intruded upon while in one’s own house,
or not to have unauthorized pictures taken surreptitiously and published, is
out of question.
As the context evolved, the form of protection offered against violations
to privacy (whatever the term was used for at a given time) changed accord-
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ingly. Initially, it was framed within the classical remedies, such as the action
against battery or assault; later, when the field started moving towards data
protection, those remedies operating on a physical context unveiled their lim-
its. At that point, when the changes in society were already well in action,
an urge for a new solution to protect individuals against abuse of information
pertaining to them began to be felt.
Concurrent efforts defined the basis for the modern data protection laws.
On one side, some countries were attempting to create their own legislation.
On the other, the Council of Europe (CoE) felt that a protection of personal
data was a primary human right, and decided that personal data had to be
credited a protection within the frame of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Hence the first significant attempt at creating a harmonized
discipline, a minimal degree of protection that was to be accorded to every
individual, independently of the specific privacy law he or she was subject
to, which could vary from one country from another. CoE’s Convention
108 set some milestones in the form of principles that every legislation on
data protection was supposed to contain. The Convention, released in 1981,
was subscribed over time by all the countries involved in CoE, and had the
important effect of fostering the discussion on privacy laws, which ultimately
led to the adoption of a discipline in every country.
The real engine of the evolution in privacy laws, however, was the Euro-
pean Union, which in 1995 created the directive 95/46/EC on the protection
of personal data. Many of the principles introduced by CoE were infused
in the directive, and the subsequent adoption of national privacy laws com-
pliant with the European provisions was the long-sought-after destination of
decades of discussion. Of course, this also included the ongoing evolution
of the legislation on privacy, because the continual changes in technology,
and consequently in society, kept calling for adaptations of the laws to the
arising needs. Both the directive and the national laws were integrated in
the following years, and changes in privacy laws continue to this day.
It is in this context that Italy went a step ahead, introducing a provision
that had somehow made its appearance in the folds of the European directive,
but hadn’t been positively formalized as part of the harmonized law. While
the common lawfulness rules for the processing of personal data require that
the data collected do not exceed those required for the purpose of the pro-
cessing, the principle of necessity (also called data minimisation) introduced
in the so-called Italian privacy code (art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03) requires that
information systems and softwares make use of non-identifiable data, or data
that allow identification of the data subject only when necessary, every time
they are eligible for being used in the place of personal data.
The novelty of this article is twofold: on one hand, it goes a step for-
ward in delimiting the powers of the data controller, giving the data subject
a greater confidence that the processing complies with the original agree-
ment to which consent was given; on the other, it is aimed primarily at
the information society. Since the processing that can be carried out with
computer-based equipment operates on a much larger scale than manual pro-
cessing, the Italian privacy code decided to surround this type of processing
with additional limitations, in favor of the data subject.
The provision is real, actual, and frequently applied by the competent
authority. Also, it is struggling to overstep the borders of national legislation,
making its appearance in the proposal for a new regulation in the context of
an overhaul of the supranational privacy legislation, which is currently being
discussed within the European Union.
To avoid misunderstandings, two small premises are in order. First off, the
term “privacy” is used sparingly throughout the text, often in the improper
meaning described above. But after all, it is used this way everywhere: in
political discussions, in theoretical literature, in day-to-day conversations.
The term has expanded beyond its original meaning, and for the sake of
simplicity the modern meaning of the term is used throughout this text in
the place of sentences that more closely resemble that concept. Clearly,
when some doubt can arise as to the concept referred to (whether the strict,
traditional meaning of not being intruded upon, or the broader, modern one
encompassing the protection of personal data), either the proper wording, or
additional details accompanying the term, will be given.
“Principle of necessity” is the immediate translation of the Italian term
used in art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03. When the authority for the protection of
personal data refers to art. 3 in some decision that has an English version
as well as the Italian one, it speaks of “data minimisation” instead, and the
same term appears in the EU proposal for a new regulation, where it appears
to have a slightly different scope. The reason behind the choice of calling it
simply “principle of necessity” is to highlight a stronger tie with the current
Italian discipline, pointing out that it is actually a “principle”, a guideline,
adhesion to which is not easy to verify within a court.
 Chapter 1. Introduction
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Birth and evolution of
privacy
The concept of privacy is one that has always had some importance in his-
tory, but only in recent times it has come to a concrete expression in law.
Whereas the interest in being anonymous or in having a public personality
to participate in political life has been relevant all through history, the need
to protect this interest has reached a relevant size only in the last century
or so, and in the long run this brought to a definition, evolution, detailing,
specification and protection of the right (rectius, the set of rights) called
privacy.
How this happened is detailed in plenty of sources, a good deal of which
are often mentioned in literature (Pardolesi, 2003, p. 3). The change was
manifold, and took different paths at different latitudes and longitudes, and
at different levels of hierarchy. The different approaches adopted by judges in
the first place, then by the laws of different countries and (concurrently) by
supranational institutions gave different results, and in the end many facets
emerged out of what was once considered the individual’s “right to be left
alone” (an expression which apparently dates back to judge Cooley (Cooley,
1878)).
The current (but certainly not final) result is a concept with many dif-
ferent meanings, from the original right to be left alone, to the individual’s
choice of making some personal data known to others to allow them to provide
him or her some service. There is a constant tension between the individual
on one side, not willing to sparingly give away his or her personal informa-
tion, and database holders on the others, for which individuals’ data have
become a huge business, and being able to access, and maybe sell, those

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data can be significantly profitable. This evolution is still far from reaching
a balance.
2.1 Back in ancient times
Whereas privacy is conceived today as a value to preserve and protect, the
same has not always held true. In fact, even taking into account only the
traditional meaning of privacy, that is the right to have no intrusions into
one’s own private life, for a long time the very idea of private life has been
regarded in a negative perspective (Niger, 2006, pp. 1–21).
Starting back in ancient Greece, there was really no substantial distinc-
tion between private and public life. Men were supposed to participate in
the city’s political life, and to do that they needed to be publicly exposed.
The house was the place where men carried out their business, and to have
a public life they were supposed to have such a place; poor people without
a house (including slaves) could not afford to be part of the city’s social life,
because they lacked a place for their affairs. On the other hand, those people
with enough wealth to have a house but who avoided public political life
were shunned and considered “idiots”, literally: the term comes from idion,
meaning “one’s own”. Idiotes were those people with a private business, in
contrast with those dealing in public affairs. In ancient Greece, the idea of
being on one’s self, away from public life, was the evil twin of what privacy
is today. While low-class people living outside the city were generally unin-
terested in politics, citizens of the polis were not allowed private interests,
which were considered just an excuse to avoid social duties.
Ancient Rome was not much different. Public offices were assigned to
people personally, and they carried their titles as part of their own identity,
similarly to modern nobility. A public life, in the sense of a participation in
politics, was part of a man’s achievements, and those people denied access to
public careers were considered lowly and incomplete. However, the Roman
world had some sort of private life, but it was under constant scrutiny. Peo-
ple’s dignity strongly depended on their behaviour, weddings, testaments,
and those of relatives and friends. People could fall in the eyes of society for
their libertine behaviour as well as for not publicly condemning that of their
own friend or daughter. Even emperors were not above such a public control.
Again, the borders between public and private life were rather blurred.
Moderate changes occurred during the Middle Ages. The society changed
dramatically in the feudal system, and even public affairs were related to
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property. The fragmentation of the public authority led to an almost com-
plete replacement of offices with private property. In other words, there was
nothing public, only private. But the strictly hierarchical structure of society
led people to coalesce into aggregations with a relationship of closeness both
physical and social: the neighbourhoods. People knew their neighbours and
all facts about them, curiosity and voyeurism were frequent, and this aggre-
gation formed a sort of solidarity, of protection against rulers and outsiders.
Those seeking shelter from the neighbours, craving a solipsistic reclusion,
were regarded as weird at best. There was some form of privacy, but it was
at a collective level, not individual.
The following centuries marked the significant changes in privacy. Several
factors influenced society in a way that led individuals to seek shelter from
the world and engage in solo activities, but the most relevant was the increase
in literacy. The ability to read and write allowed people to spend time in
lonely thinking, and to entrust their thought to diaries or personal writings
of some sort. A collective society made up of neighbours tends to shrink, and
the house becomes the place to spend that time alone. Privacy moved one
step forward, from a widely-collective privacy to a need for the family, while
the world outside the walls shifted into anonimity. This does not mean that
the external sociability was dissolved, because in the meantime social groups
were forming, held together by common interests, but the link was no longer
necessarily physical and imposed by the location of one’s own house, but by
individual choices.
2.2 At the origin of privacy
Although there are several previous episodes which could somehow relate to
what has later been called privacy (Pardolesi, 2003, pp. 4–5), the term it-
self appeared in the legal language at the end of the 19th century, and most
sources (Alpa, 2002, pp. 320–321; Frosini, 1984) assume the concept to be
born on that occasion. The story tells of a Massachussetts senator, Samuel
D. Warren, who was being harassed by the press for his mundane life. Con-
sidering this to be an intrusion in what was his right to have “some retreat
from the world”, he wrote an article with his friend, the would-be judge of
the Supreme Court Louis D. Brandeis. The article (Warren and Brandeis,
1890), published in the Harvard Law Journal, expressed the senator’s con-
cerns against “the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers” that
were “overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency”.
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In short, at its origin, the concept of privacy was strictly connected to
that of property, and a violation to privacy was little more than a violation to
property, such as taking pictures of a person in his private environment. Sev-
eral features connecting privacy to property emerged from this view (Roppo,
1985, pp. 16–17). The main feature of the content of privacy, at this early
stage, was a physical nature, strictly tied to the person or his properties. The
right to privacy was equivalent to the “right to be left alone”, and the under-
lying interest was that nobody would enter an individual’s house, or track
his movements, or take undesired pictures. Additionally, privacy was strictly
individualistic, as the idea was to exclude everybody else from harassing the
individual or the places relating to him (“my house, my castle” (Pardolesi,
2003, p. 8)).
The result was a view of privacy that was very close to the property rights,
and meant to be protected as such. Close, but not identical, because even
the most basic concept of privacy goes beyond that (Epstein and University
of Chicago. Law School, 2000). Wherever a property right can be found, it
is sufficient per se to grant some sort of protection to privacy. If privacy were
only about the intrusion into one’s own land, a person could build walls to
prevent others from entering, and those walls are capable of blocking vision
inside the land. But privacy is not limited to a physical context, so for
example eavesdropping on a private conversation held in a non-private place
would still be considered a violation to privacy, even though no property
right is involved. Even with this extension with respect to property rights,
however, privacy at its first stage was meant as a limitation to others people’s
intrusions, as the right of an individual to carry on his or her private life
while protected against unwanted harassment and with the choice over what
to disclose, and to whom.
In theory, this protection was meant for all individuals and against generic
intrusions by everybody else, but in reality the only individuals to whom this
concept of privacy applied were those with a public personality and fame,
such as actors or politicians; on the other side, this protection existed only
against press and newspapers in this first age, which were (more or less) the
sole entities who had an interest in invading the individual’s properties, to
capture details or facts that the person would rather keep confidential.
In the decades following Warren and Brandeis’s publication, there was a
lot of evolution in the concept of privacy. The courts issued many decisions
which have subsequently been encapsulated in a wide meaning of privacy.
Subsequently, because such decisions do not refer to the very term privacy,
but generally try to invoke some other tort, be it (most frequently) battery
or trespass. A deep analysis by Dean Prosser of many of the decisions issued
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throughout a large number of States of the Union (Prosser, 1069) tries to
create some order and identify the scope of privacy and its limits. This
classification finds four different branches for the “privacy tort”:
1. The first, and most obvious, form of an “invasion of privacy” relates
to intrusion or prying. Privacy is violated when there is an “intrusion
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs”.
Of course, there is some overlapping with other torts, because this
aspect of the privacy tort displays a strong connection with property
rights; and in fact, some of the decisions on this action allow recovery
without specifying what right had been actually violated, be it battery
or trespass. The article explains that, in order for an intrusion to
exist, “the thing into which there is prying or intrusion must be, and
be entitled to be, private”, and the intrusion must be “something which
would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man”. So, outside
the frame of this form of the privacy tort is any situation in which
the prying is legitimate, such as a landlord entering the house asking
for the rent, or the police taking fingerprints while acting within their
powers, or when a picture is taken in a crowded street. This kind of
protection is obviously aimed at any individual, since an intrusion or
prying into any private property is eligible for the tort.
2. Warren and Brandeis were mainly concerned with Prosser’s second form
of privacy, the public disclosure of private facts. Knowledge of facts
about an individual, independently of how that knowledge had been
acquired, did not give the right to disclose them to the public. Again,
there must be some conditions as to where the limits of this protection
operate. Public means “public”, so that no minor disclosure of private
facts (for example, to the individual’s employer) can enact the tort;
and while this is a clear and easy requirement, two others were much
more complex and a major source of discussion. Facts must be private,
and not public; if something happens in a place visible to anybody
and is later disclosed (for example published in a newspapaer), to some
extent the plaintiff’s case must be rejected; but some decisions state
that “when an individual is [. . . ] singled out from the public scene, and
undue attention is focused upon him, there is an invasion of his private
rights”; also, privacy is violated when pictures are taken surreptitiously,
or over the individual’s objections, or in general when the consent of the
individual is dubious at best. The third, and discussed, condition for
the enacting of this form of the privacy tort is that the facts disclosed
are to be considered offensive to the individual. According to the courts’
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decisions, the answer is definitely positive, and many cases (including
Melvin vs. Reid, concerning the disclosure of the story of a former
prostitute and defendant against a case of murder) follow this trend;
the article also highlights Sidis vs. F-R Publishing Company, where the
story of a former infant prodigy who had rejected his past and gone to
a life away from the spotlights had been published, with serious effects
on the plaintiff’s health, but again the decision rejected the plaintiff’s
case, because nothing offensive or objectionable had been released. This
form of protection, differently from the first one, is clearly aimed at
individuals who have some sort of notoriety, and have some reason to
hide that notoriety from the public or to save some private corners for
their private affairs.
3. The third form of the privacy tort was a false publicity, such as a name
abuse to attribute a work to a notorious individual, or the inclusion
of one’s name into a record of well-known criminals. For this form
of the tort to operate, the false publicity must be objectionable, so
that a minor mistake in a biography does not enact the tort. This
form of privacy violation (which can be aimed at any individual but
mostly applies to those with some notoriety) is related to reputation,
and nowadays it is protected in ways not always relating to privacy laws.
For example, Italy has a protection against the abuse of a person’s name
or picture in artt. 7–10 of the civil code.
4. Probably, Prosser’s fourth form of privacy tort, the exploitation of an
individual’s identity, is the most interesting one in the perspective of
the concept’s evolution. The violation applies, for example, when a
person’s picture is taken and sold. To be allowed an action, the appro-
priation must concern the person’s identity (so if the individual is not
recognizable no violation can be detected). Whereas there are specific
disciplines to protect individuals from commercial abuse of their iden-
tity (e.g., the Italian law on copyright, l. 633/1941, artt. 96–97), this
form of the privacy tort paved the way to the incoming evolution of
privacy, which was soon to change into the protection of personal data.
Those data, information, and facts that can be connected to the iden-
tity of a specific individual can pose a threat to privacy in its modern
meaning, in contrast to those data which are anonymous and cannot
be associated with a specific person. At the time of the aforementioned
article, the change in the concept of privacy was at its beginning.
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2.3 Modern age: the new meaning of privacy
Three factors were the main responsible for a major change in the meaning
of privacy: the advent of the welfare state, the evolution of information
technology, and the Internet.
The welfare state introduced many public services to assist citizens. So-
cial security, public safety and defense, political rights, postal services, insur-
ances, public health and so on, all required the individual to disclose some
information about himself or herself. Such services need to know some in-
formation about the individual, depending on what the service provides. So,
for example, public health requires hospitals to acquire information about
an individual’s diseases or health problems; and social security needs de-
tails about a person’s job and income. This led public institutions to start
collecting data about citizens, to allow these services to be effective.
The data banks of course started with paper documentation. As a starter,
it was sufficient for the basic purposes of the welfare state, but in the long
run these data banks showed some limitations. The amount of data that
could be collected was limited, and a lot of storage space was required. An
imperfect organization of the sheets could lead to data losses or long search
times. Not to mention the difficulties in keeping the information up to date
or fixing incorrect data.
The huge breach came with the advent of information technology. It
allowed the transformation of impractical data banks into efficient computer
databases. This change, occurred during the last century, can be outlined as
a three-step process (Pascuzzi, 2002, pp. 43–44):
1. from the beginning of the computer age up to the Seventies, computers
were extremely expensive and bulky machines, which could be afforded
(both for the cost and for the rooming required) only by public institu-
tions. During this time, computer databases started to be created for
public purposes;
2. during the Eighties, computers were affordable by large private com-
panies. New databases started emerging for non-public and non-social
purposes, but rather private and commercial;
3. since the Nineties, computers powerful enough to host a database are
affordable by any individual, so there has been a huge growth in the
number of databases, the data collected, and the connections among
them, for public and private, commercial and non-commercial purposes.
 Chapter 2. Birth and evolution of privacy
Computer databases are much more efficient than paper archives. They
can be easily maintained, they are physically small and easily portable,
searches and updates take a short time and effort, and so on. The growth of
computers has led to a huge number of data spread across the world, with
all sorts of information about a person’s family, health, job, habits, and so
on.
The third step was the advent of the Internet, because it allows an im-
mediate exchange of information, and thus instant collection of data. Many
services, both public and private, have migrated to the Internet, and many
more have been born there. Today there are many companies which oper-
ate solely on the Internet, completely removing any physical site or direct
interaction with the customer. Thinking of rolling back and stop the flow of
data would be a mere illusion. Plenty of businesses and services nowadays
would be completely unable to exist if they were not allowed to keep and
share data.
This led to a new dimension of privacy, one which had not been perceived
before and which emerged from a new society. Individuals had the need to
benefit from some services, and for that reason they had an interest in dis-
closing their personal data to those services. The resulting interest was no
longer in keeping personal data confidential, but in controlling which data
were being disclosed, to whom, and for what purposes. Privacy tore itself out
of the boundaries of property rights, and moved towards the rights related to
personality (Roppo, 1984). An author (Epstein and University of Chicago.
Law School, 2000), in the attempt to place privacy in the frame of preexist-
ing common law subjects, asserts that the traditional, “isolated” concept of
privacy relates to the interaction with strangers, and can be compared to the
law of tort, while the new concept is more similar to contract law because
it pertains to consensual agreements between parties. As simplistic as this
view can be, it is actually based on true assumptions.
The old model, the one based on the total non-disclosure of personal data,
was not suitable anymore for the new society, from two perspectives (Par-
dolesi, 2003, p. 13). On one side, the model would fail the moment the
individual chose to release some of his or her data; on the other, the effi-
ciency of the public administration and of the economic system in general
would lose many of the benefits that practice has proven effective. A new
privacy legislation needed to provide both permissions and prohibitions, to
allow the useful collection of the data required, and to prevent their improper
usage (Roppo, 1985, p. 27).
In the new vision, privacy was not a uniform right belonging to the family
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of property rights, but rather, over several decades many facets of what is
called privacy were born. These can be summed up as (Pascuzzi, 2002,
pp. 47–48):
I right of knowledge about data being collected;
I right to access the data;
I right to update incomplete or incorrect data;
I right to have the data removed when the purpose for which they were
originally collected has expired (a stronger form of this is creeping into
the laws, a “right to be forgotten” that allows erasure at the individual’s
will);
I plus a special protection for special categories of data, called sensitive
data, such as race, religion, sexual life and so on.
These are the fundamentals of the various privacy laws that emerged
during the last decades, as described in chapter 3.
2.4 The new business model
The new society, born from computers and their interconnection, created a
new business model in the private sector, where personal data are key to
offering services. Generally, services beforehand warn potential users about
the fact that they are going to collect some data, stating the purposes for
which these data are going to be used, and requesting the user’s consent
before going on. At least, this is how it works in theory.
And this has actually created a situation in which the service collecting
the data is the entity that has more interest in the safety of those data (Pas-
cuzzi, 2002, pp. 51–52). The service provider can offer a service which will
be much more to the liking of the customer the more it knows about him
or her. Thus, the service provider has a major benefit in gathering as much
data as possible about the customer, his or her interests, habits, relation-
ships and so on. But the customer will need to know that his or her data
are being processed fairly and safely before entrusting them to the service
provider. The providers will therefore have an interest in storing the cus-
tomers’ data safely, taking as many precautions as they can to ensure they
are not illegitimately accessed, modified or erased. Publicly-known events
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that compromise a provider’s dependability (such as the repeated hacks on
Mastercard accounts) can cause a serious hazard to the provider’s customer
base. According to a study published in 1997, “Consumers want to control
what personal information is disclosed about them, to whom, and how that
information will be used. As a result, electronic commerce will flourish only
if we are able to agree on, and implement, fair information practices for the
information age” (United States. National Information Infrastructure Task
Force. Information Policy Committee, 1997). Again, this is theory.
There are several flaws which taint the smoothness of this model. The
first one, and probably the most critical, is the fact that most Internet users
tend to be quite careless about the information they give away1. Sharing
information on the Internet can pose many risks to a person. There are many
reports about employees being fired for complaining over their employer on a
social media (though now some protection has started to be afforded by labor
judges in the United States2. Armin Meiwes was convicted for cannibalism
after p)osting a request for new victims on a public web site3. Generally
users don’t take into account the risks of releasing personal information on
public web sites.
Another flaw in this theoretical model is the fact that the user’s consent
is not necessarily genuine. The individual is generally limited to the choice of
giving his or her consent to the processing of his or her data, or forfeit using
the service altogether. This has been called “the myth of consent” (Rodotà,
1973), although the situation has improved drastically over the years. The
problem, in its most basic form, is that the individual has no real control
over the information that will be collected, their duration, or the way they
will be used; he or she only gets to choose between “yes” or “no” to a license
agreement that is usually too complex for the average person to fully grasp.
And answering “no” might be as noxious as taking the risk of sharing personal
data, because it might cause a denial of the service, whether it is a commercial
purchase, or being hired by an employer.
The aforementioned problem was detected already several decades ago,
but a lot of progress has been done in the meantime on the subject, both in
legislation and in its application to databases. The data subject, upon signing
a contract or subscribing to a service, is generally confronted with more than
one request to process his or her personal data. One of these is mandatory,
1Plenty or documentation reports this threat, e.g. http://www.consumerreports.
org/cro/magazine/2012/06/facebook-your-privacy/index.htm.
2See http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/07/
judge-forces-employer-to-rehire-workers-who-vented-on-facebook/.
3Covered, for example, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3286721.stm.
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and concerns those data, and that kind of processing, which is by all means
required to provide the service. The provider is technically unable to provide
the service unless allowed to some degree of data storage and processing (for
example, the name of the data subject and his credit card information), so, if
the individual does not give his or her consent to that amount of processing,
the subscription is not possible. But it is also common practice to introduce
some additional (and separate) consent requests, for example to be allowed
to send marketing offers the individual might be interested in, or to share the
data with business associates or companies providing similar services. Such
a consent is not considered mandatory, and the individual can benefit from
the service or sign the contract without consenting to this kind of processing.
The risks, however, are not utterly removed, for at least four reasons:
I first off, not all forms or contracts have this distinction. It is not unusual
to find a single, “all-inclusive” consent request, which, for example,
includes the consent to process the data for marketing purposes;
I secondly, the “minimal” consent is not modulable, it remains a matter
of “give or forfeit”. The individual has no control whatsoever over the
degree of data that are requested as mandatory. Even if some data
is blatantly not relevant or impossible to provide, a user not willing
or unable to give his or her consent to process those data is only left
with the option of forfeiting the service altogether. For example, many
online forms require a telephone number to be provided, or else they
won’t let the user proceed with the service. If the user does not have
a telephone, or is not willing to share it (most services will never call
their users on the phone nonetheless), the service is barred;
I moreover, it is extremely hard, if not impossible, for the individual to
track the circulation of data pertaining to him or her. If the service
provider does not respect the client’s denial of consent to transmit
data to third parties, the individual might never be aware of this. For
example, upon receiving unsolicited marketing offers from an unknown
company, it is very unlikely that the individual is able to tell where his
or her personal data were acquired from;
I consent forms are generally expressed as long license agreements, whose
content is beyond the average individual subscribing to the service, so it
is common practice to simply skip the reading and pass on to giving or
denying the consent. Although the complexity of the agreement would
probably be a valid argument in a court, and important clauses that are
not highlighted for everyone to understand would be considered invalid,
 Chapter 2. Birth and evolution of privacy
until then the individual is at the mercy of a consent given without
a full knowledge, with the possible effects of undesired processing or
circulation of personal data.
At any rate, apart from these issues regarding its effectiveness, the prac-
tice of distinguishing several degrees of consent on the user’s part raises the
threshold of the protection of the data subject against a wanton use of his
or her personal data. Requesting a mandatory “core” consent and some op-
tional “additional” ones allows the data subject to benefit from the service,
without (for example, but the example is in fact the main reason for the
additional consent) being harassed by commercial offers. From a conceptual
point of view, this “partitioned consent” is driven by a rule that in many
ways resembles the principle of necessity, described in detail in chapter 5.
The individual willing to use a service must agree to the processing of some
personal data, but these are limited to those strictly necessary to provide the
service; the provider may request a consent to additional processing of the
user’s data, but this will be for a different purpose, and its denial must not
be in contrast with the main processing required for providing the service.
The theory of the business model also hides another problem: want it or
not, data are collected. Even before the user is asked for consent to disclose
some personal data, he or she has already accessed a web site which is now
informed about this access. Cookies, log files (Pascuzzi, 2002, pp. 49–50),
session data, geolocalization, all are means that are used to collect data even
before the user has given his or her consent. Normally, when these tracking
tools are born, after some time they are countered by adequate technological
protection; nonetheless they pose a continuous threat to privacy.
2.5 The ghost of all-out control
George Orwell’s 1984 (only to mention the most famous specimen of the
genre) was not just an imaginative novel. The author reported the to-
talitarisms he had experienced, clearly exaggerating the environment, and
showing that a strict monitoring of the people can be used to control them.
However, Orwell was familiar with the technology of his age, but today’s
information technology would be much more suited to achieve that degree of
control.
And indeed the shade of the world depicted by Orwell has been felt
through the years (Franceschelli, 1998b, pp. 6–7). The idea of governments
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creating large data banks with all sorts of information about citizens has
been a major worry that paced the growth of the computer society. There
are several reasons behind this worry: first and foremost, the feeling in itself
of being monitored in all aspects of one’s life, from business, movements, ac-
quaintances, to more intimate facets such as religious beliefs, political views,
sexual life and health. Beyond that basic “control” feeling, such a knowledge
could be used in a discriminatory way, especially when it comes to political
views and religious beliefs, for example by rejecting an individual from an
employment because he or she is registered with a specific political party or
labor union (a not-so-imaginative occurrence, considering there are plenty
of laws protecting union workers from unjust firing). Also, the collection of
large amounts of data raises the stakes in case an unauthorized subject gains
access to those data.
Maybe it was only an irrational fear. But somehow, signs of an actual-
ization of that fear emerge now and then. The most notable episode is the
Safari project (Pardolesi, 2003, p. 12; Franceschelli, 1998b, pp. 9–10). In
1970, the French government decided to create a centralized database for all
public institutions, assigning every citizen an identification number which
administrations could use to access the data they needed. The name of the
project was an acronym for “Système Automatisé pour les Fichiers Adminis-
tratifs et le Répertoire des Individus”, but was also an unfortunate hunting
term. When the project was made known, in 1974, the press was so aggres-
sive in highlighting the dangers of such an archive4, that the government was
forced to back off, stop the project and take a totally different approach to
privacy, creating a law inspired by the principles that had started emerging
throughout Europe (the results are summarized in section 3.2).
Safari was a clear example of the worries caused by databases containing
personal information. But there are other degrees of control that can be
achieved. Insurance companies operating in the United States, for example,
share a common database, where they access all the historical roster of a
person’s events with a car, especially accidents and how they occurred. Based
on this information, they can choose a premium cost for the policy they offer
to a customer, and in such a way a person who has been involved in several
accidents can’t get an affordable policy, independently of which company he
or she chooses.
Even at the time of the Safari project, the problem was not new at all.
For example, it had already been envisioned in a small pamphlet (Rodotà,
4The article “«Safari» ou la chasse aux Français”, published on March 24th, 1974
on the newspaper “Le Monde”, can be found at http://rewriting.net/2008/02/11/
safari-ou-la-chasse-aux-francais/.
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1973), which describes the incoming changes in society. As outlined by the
pamphlet’s author, the emerging technologies are creating new opportunities,
improving the efficiency of the social system as a whole (both in the private
and public sector). There is certainly an interest in gathering as much data
as possible to provide better and more targeted services; but this general
interest comes into clash with the individual’s right to preserve his or her own
privacy. This right also encompasses the choice to benefit from such services
and to select which personal information to disclose, instead of letting that
choice go to public administrations (or even private companies). The risk
of a wanton collection of data is that of excluding the individuals from such
choices. There must be a check between the general interests of the Welfare
State, and the protection of the individual’s choices. Such a check can be
obtained via a legislation that explicitly states criteria for collecting and
maintaining data, and offers a guarantee against abuse of those data.
A project whose objectives were similar to Safari ’s emerged in Italy dur-
ing the Nineties (Minerva, 1998). The first signs of the project appeared in
l. 1992, October 23rd, n. 421, delegating the Government the refactoring of a
wide number of public disciplines. Among these, art. 2, letter mm) requested
provisions to reorganize the information system within and across the Italian
public offices, with the aim of “guaranteeing the interconnection of public IT
systems”; this also required the creation of an ad-hoc institution to coordi-
nate the evolution of this interconnected system and the related expenses.
This produced, among the others, two delegated decrees:
I d.lgs. 1993, February 23rd, n. 39, which created the Autorità per l’infor-
matica nella pubblica amministrazione (AIPA). This authority was de-
signed to improve the overall information system of the Italian public
administration, and it underwent a number of changes over the years:
it was changed when the new Italian law on the processing of per-
sonal data was published, in 2003 (as described in section 4.4); later, it
was merged into the Centro nazionale per l’informatica nella pubblica
amministrazione (CNIPA); the CNIPA, in turn, was recently changed
into the Ente nazionale per la digitalizzazione della pubblica ammini-
strazione (DigitPA);
I d.lgs. 1993, February 3rd, n. 29, for the improvement of the efficiency
of the public administration. Art. 11 assigns AIPA the task of defin-
ing the models of information systems that should be used in public
administrations.
The overall result was a project called Rete unitaria per la pubblica am-
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ministrazione (RUPA)5. The idea of RUPA was to improve the activity of
the public administration, by eliminating redundancies, using collaborative
office technologies, more specialized operators, all to provide more dynamic
and fast administrative procedures. Of course, RUPA was supposed to be
based on the Internet, which was having a large expansion at the time, with
the addition of security techniques to avoid violations such as sniffing of file
transfers. In technical terms, RUPA would operate as a set of protocols (at
the transport level and above) that would have to be implemented on all
softwares and hardwares used by the Public administration (PA).
The project failed for several reasons, not the least of which was the com-
plexity of the project, facing a wide number of administrations that would fail
to meet the minimal requirements (in terms of the status of their information
systems) for even starting a unification process. But there were also several
non-technical issues the RUPA project crashed into (Manca, 2008). First off,
the project was launched in the absence of a national discipline on personal
data protection, which would come to life only at the end of 1996 (details are
in section 4.3). Such a discipline would completely overturn the context in
which the collection of data by the PA could operate, providing a number of
strict lawfulness requirements and criteria under which data were supposed
to be collected, stored, and (using the generic term) processed. The RUPA
project was started not only before the Italian law existed, but also ahead
of an European-level discipline. Although most of the principles that would
come to life in the would-be European directive and Italian legislation had
already been defined to some extent by CoE (as described in section 3.1),
the context was still blurred and allowed for a high degree of freedom at
the time, especially in Italy where the law on personal data protection was
delayed so much; such a freedom in data processing by PAs would no longer
be possible under the legislation that came later. For example, the right of
access of every individual to his or her personal data would hardly fit inside
a model designed only for the interoperability of PAs.
Other problems involved the nature of the AIPA, with the powers of an
independent authority. Initially, the whole project was supposed to be coor-
dinated by AIPA alone, and the protocols, security measures, and technology
in general would be under the exclusive supervision of AIPA. The creation of
the Guarantor for the protection of personal data (described in section 4.3)
introduced a new major stakeholder in the picture, one who would necessar-
ily have its part in the definition of the RUPA models, since they also had
to operate in a context that provided adequate guarantees for the rights of
5The official information about the project still exists in a very outdated web site at
http://www.fnada.it/archivio/Servizi/rupa.htm.
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individuals involving their personal data.
Eventually, the RUPA project died of starvation around 1999. Of course,
the social and technological changes occurred from then on did not cause it,
and its objectives, to be forfeit, but rather to emerge with greater urgency
and call for a new reorganization of the public information infrastructures.
The idea of unifying the processing of personal data across all PAs is the basis
for a major improvement in the efficiency of the system as a whole. Today,
such a reorganization must be thought of while keeping in mind the recent
evolution in the individuals’ rights with respect to their personal data. Nowa-
days, several public sectors have undergone a good degree of unification; for
example, many Italian Regions have adopted the standard protocol Health
Level Seven (HL7)6 as a unified basis for health-related data, and it is cur-
rently used in many hospitals, universities, research centers, and industries,
both private and public. A full unification of public information systems that
guarantees security and ensures the exercisability of the individuals’ rights
regarding their own data is a gigantic effort, but also a desirable result.
Now and then, the problem of control emerges again. Processing of per-
sonal data is not a standalone branch of legislation, but is rather a traversal
subject involved in a lot of matters. For this reason, the opposing interests
involved in privacy are often stretched for seemingly-unrelated purposes. A
perfect example entwines privacy with copyright. In the last decades, the
Internet has been more and more used to circumvent copyright laws, sharing
copyrighted content illegitimately in such a way that the copyright holders
are not remunerated. Such a phenomenon has proven totally uncontrollable,
and every attempt at blocking illicit traffic has always been easily defeated
by new technical solutions. To counter the problem, some copyright holders
have changed their business model to suit the changes, and to take advan-
tage of the new technologies instead of seeing them as an obstacle to their
rights; while many others have tried, and are still trying, to stick to their
traditional business model, either investing a lot on technical solutions to
block distribution attempts (but with very ineffective results7), or trying to
press legislations towards very restrictive laws. Such laws can often be very
invasive of privacy.
For example, it has been observed (Caso, 2008) that the ways of con-
trasting the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted material over Peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks involve: aggressive promotional campaigns, actions
6http://www.hl7.org/.
7There are several reports of such protections being broken on the day
of their release, e.g., http://games.slashdot.org/story/10/03/05/027258/
ubisofts-new-drm-cracked-in-one-day.
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against file sharing services, Digital Rights Management (DRM) tools, and
actions against P2P users. The last two approaches create conflicts between
copyright and privacy. The famous ruling by the Court of Justice against
Promusicae [6] revolved around a case where a copyright holder had required
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to track the Internet traffic of their cus-
tomers and provide the company with a list of the individuals responsible for
circumventing copyright laws. The final decision was against the copyright
holder because the consent the users had given to the processing of personal
data when using P2P networks was for purposes different from the tracking
of their identities in case of copyright infringement, and the use of personal
data in a civil court was not a processing exempt from the consent of the
data subject.
A recent example of this kind of law was again in France, called Haute
Autorité pour la diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur Internet
(HADOPI) law 8, also known as “three strikes law” or “Sarkozy doctrine”. The
purpose of the law was to progressively warn copyright violators about the
possible consequences of their actions, and cut them off from the Internet,
solving the contract with the provider and preventing them from forming a
new one, after the third violation. Needless to say, the law didn’t work and
has long since gone into silence; the reasons for this failure, whose analysis
is beyond the scope of this work, are the same for which any attempt at
enforcing Internet traffic goes to no avail (mainly the technical difficulty to
apply them, the limitations they would also cause to legitimate traffic, and
the controversies raised by any law that attempts to charge providers with
liability for the behaviour of their customers (Sartor, 2012)). Two similar
laws (Camera dei deputati, 2009a,b) were proposed in Italy in 2009, but
didn’t go anywhere beyond a preliminary parliamentary discussion (and a
lot of criticism in media).
2.6 Today
As much as the World Wide Web opened the doors to a new interpretation
of the right to privacy, it was the so-called Web 2.0 that tore down the
walls of the old concept. The term generically denotes a new generation of
services, providers, tools, web sites, where the content is generated by users,
as opposed to the first generation, made up primarily of static web sites.
8Law 2009-669 of 2009, July 12th. The details can be found at http://www.senat.fr/
dossier-legislatif/pjl07-405.html.
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In other words, the first generation was characterized by a clear distinc-
tion between content creators and content users. The former were those who
created the web site, adding, removing or changing the content when they
deemed necessary, while the latter could interact with these sites passively,
only acquiring the information provided therein. In the Web 2.0, this distinc-
tion is much more blurred, and many web pages are highly dynamic, with
users able to add their own content. The barrier hasn’t fallen completely
yet, because behind every service there is an administrative board that takes
decisions about the policies to allow users to add content, user banning, con-
tent removal and so on, nevertheless it is a totally different approach from
the old-generation (but still existing and widespread) static web pages.
The new approach has encroached all kinds of web sites: starting with
announcement services9, trading services10, weblogs (later known as blogs),
the way opened to larger-scale sharing, with video streaming11, social net-
works12, encyclopedias13, traveling14 and many more. These services rely on
either new technologies or smart ways of applying old ones, such as PHP,
Javascript or AJAX.
The most dangerous spot in this model is located between the chair and
the keyboard. The breach in the old concept of privacy comes from the fact
that users willingly share plenty of personal data on these services, sometimes
with an eye on the possible consequences, and recklessly more often than
not. The risk of a wanton disclosure of personal data to the public lies in
the fact that those data become, well, public. If adequate precautions are
not taken, those data become available both to the intended recipients of
the disclosure and to people the data subject didn’t mean to disclose them
to. Any individual without specific technical skills can easily find a lot of
data on most people, starting from just very little basic information. Even
anonymization techniques have proven inefficient, and several cases proved
that it is possible to reidentify a person from the list of keywords entered in a
search engine; from a single combination of minor data available about that
person (namely city, birth date, and gender); and even from the movies he or
she has reviewed (Ohm, 2010). Clearly, organized companies or institutions
affording large-scale search services can track a person much more closely
than that. So it happens, for example, that a hiring company knows much
9E.g., Craigslist.
10The oldest and most famous are eBay and Amazon.
11The best known one is YouTube.
12A lot of these spring up all the time. Facebook, Twitter, Google+ are only the best
known, but there are literally thousands of these.
13Wikipedia above all.
14E.g., TripAdvisor.
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more about a candidate than what is written in the resume, possibly more
than he or she was willing to disclose to the company.
Even people who are careful in disclosing personal information perceive
this as a potential threat. According to a recent study carried on by the
European Commission on people’s behaviour with respect to social network-
ing (European Commission, 2012c; Eurobarometer, 2011), “three-quarters of
Europeans think that the disclosure of personal data is an increasing part of
modern life. At the same time, 72% of internet (sic) users are worried that
they give away too much personal data online. They feel they do not have
complete control of their data.”
This opens a whole new world of problems, unfathomable before. To what
extent must the information be considered public? Must a user disclosing
some personal data on a public service agree that those data will be known
by anybody? Is there a relationship between the knowledge of personal data
about a person and the usability of those data? When personal data are
released on a public service, is there a restriction on their usability, can or
anybody coming into contact with them use them for purposes different from
those intended by the service? A user might also do a mistake in releasing
data, for example making it accessible to a wider public than he or she meant
to. Does this imply that the information can be used at the same conditions
as a correctly disclosed one by those who came into contact with it? What
about disclosed data that are later cancelled by the user posting them? Most
services frequently make backup copies of their content, so what has been
posted at one time might still exist somewhere; to what conditions and by
whom is it accessible? Which companies or public institutions can use such
information, and how? What are the boundaries between private companies
and public institutions with respect to access to this kind of information?
Some of these questions have already received preliminary responses (sec-
tion 2.4 already mentioned labor judges forcing employers to hire back em-
ployees fired for complaints posted on social networks), however there is
plenty of room for discussion before a good balance between the interests
involved is found.
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3
Privacy in legislation
The state of the art in privacy law is the outcome of several decades of
evolution, especially in Europe where several different paths were followed.
Although seemingly independent, an analysis of the timing and content of
these attempts shows a long thread that starts from some incidental regula-
tions, then takes shape in some recommendations by the Council of Europe
(section 3.1). At that point, the Council keeps on building over its own foun-
dations, improving and refining the proposals (always sticking to its own
anchor, i.e., the ECHR), while individual states start creating their own leg-
islation (section 3.2), following the guidelines already set in the stone by CoE
(with minor differences in the implementation). At some point, the branch-
ing thread is recovered and reordered by the European Union (section 3.3),
with a directive (and its follow-ups) which is then used as a strong basis for
new domestic laws.
3.1 First attempts
Most of the initial steps in privacy legislation have been carried on by the
Council of Europe (Buttarelli, 1997, pp. 3–36). The very first approach to
the subject by the Council is in year 1968’s Recommendation 509 (Council
of Europe. Committee of Ministers, 1968), where the Council expresses its
concerns about the ongoing evolution of data collection, which might collide
with Article 8 of the ECHR: “in a great many quarters it was felt that the
position of the private citizen was becoming intolerable and that the need
for definition of a new right had arisen”. The Council suggests a renewal in
the legislation, either by individual countries or (possibly) through a harmo-
nization process by the EU.

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Several other documents by CoE followed. Along the same lines as the
aforementioned Recommendation is the Resolution (74) 29 (Council of Eu-
rope. Committee of Ministers, 1974). In the preamble, the resolution states
that it is adopted “bearing in mind Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. This res-
olution suggests to the member states “to take all steps which they consider
necessary to give effect to the principles set out in the annex to the present
resolution”.
Such principles had been introduced shortly earlier in another relevant
document by the Council of Europe, Resolution (73) 22 (Council of Europe.
Committee of Ministers, 1973) on private data banks. The annex to the
resolution contains those principles which are nowadays applied to the pri-
vacy field in general, and expressed in many later documents. For example,
the resolution requires that “the information stored should be accurate and
should be kept up to date” (art. 1), “should not be obtained by fraudulent or
unfair means” (art. 3), “the person concerned should have the right to know
the information stored about him” (art. 6) and “every care should be taken
to correct inaccurate information” (art. 7).
CoE’s urge to have a uniform legislation in all the member states became
more pressing in later years. The Parliamentary Assembly, in Recommenda-
tion (79) 866 (Committee on Science and Technology, 1979), “convinced that
the .pace of technological development in data processing and telecommuni-
cations should be matched by effective national and international legislation
to protect the rights and interests of citizens and in particular the right to
privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights”, invited the Committee of Ministers to adopt a convention on data
protection, and the governments of member states “to introduce legislation
on data protection based on the principles already worked out in the Council
of Europe”.
The requested convention was completed shortly after (Council of Europe,
1981), and can be considered the first breakthrough in the harmonization
process of data protection legislation.
The attention of the Council was focused on the difference between pri-
vacy legislation in different European States, and aimed at some sort of har-
monization. However, the convention was not created as a sort of complete
legislation, but rather as a recommendation to States to adjust their privacy
law to comply with the principles expressed therein (art. 4). That is to say
the convention is not self-executing, and the principles it expresses need to
be translated into domestic laws, not without some degree of freedom on the
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State’s part.
Such freedom comes from the lack of some definitions, such as “private life”
and “person”, for which the concept used in the individual legislation is to be
applied (whereas art. 2 gives some other definitions, namely “personal data”,
“automated data file”, “automatic processing” and “controller of the file”).
Also, the convention does not expressly state what the rights of individuals
over their private data are, but rather mentions some principles about data
security and some requirements about the storage or processing of specific
data categories. Third, the convention allows the Parties to implement some
exceptions to these principles for predefined types of data banks (art. 9).
Last, the convention in centered around the individual person, without any
consideration for representative associations (but this may well be due to the
earliness of the convention).
On the other hand, art. 3 delimits the scope of the convention. One of
the problems that had arisen in the early experiences of privacy law was
that such laws were overattentive towards automated processing of data,
without realizing that this was an opening to a circumvention of the rules by
resorting to manual processing (this problem had been expressed in the acts
of an European conference on data protection (Rodotà, 1983)). The article
explicitly states that the principles affect both automated data banks and
physical archives, ensuring that manual processing of data can not be used
to circumvent the regulations (in time, the trend will be strengthened, and a
lot of stress will be put on the equivalence between manual and automated
processing (Palmieri, 2002)). Also, art. 3 exposes the Parties to liability for
violation of ECHR’s art. 8.
The principles expressed in the convention are not much different from
those expressed in previous recommendtions:
art. 5 contains the general rules. Data should be obtained in a legal and
fair way; they should be accurate and used only for legitimate purposes
and in the needed amount, and for a duration which does not exceed
the purpose for which they were collected;
art. 6 requires some particular measures for certain categories of strictly-
personal information (sensitive data), such as political views, sexual
life, health and criminal convictions. These data should not be pro-
cessed automatically, unless the State’s law guarantees an additional
safety. The processing of some of these data categories were or are
already utterly forbidden by some constitutions (e.g., Portugal and
Luxembourg) (Buttarelli, 1997, p. 18);
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art. 7 expects the Parties to enforce security measures for the automated
processing of data, to avoid their misuse, alteration or loss;
art. 8 provides some guarantees for the individual person, who is entitled
to ascertain the existence of the storage of information about himself,
and to obtain the correction or deletion of data whose collection or
processing was contrary to the convention itself.
In a way, the convention does include a correction or erasure of inaccurate
data (which has been more clearly expressed in subsequent years); however,
it does not contain, as does no regulation as of yet (although the 2012 pro-
posals for the modernization of privacy laws is opening the way, as described
in section 3.6), a generic “right to be forgotten”, allowing the individual a
generalized erasure of all his data.
The evolving society has raised the need to extend the convention’s prin-
ciples with additional requirements. Several recommendations have been is-
sued by the Council about specific types of data processing, as in the case of
job data, payments, crime, and so on. However, major proposals for modern-
izing convention 108 are being suggested in the last months. The consultative
committee of the convention for the protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data [ETS No. 108] (T-PD), as of August
2012, has authored four proposals for modernizing the convention (T-PD,
2011, 2012a,b,c). The purpose is to align the convention with the attempt
at reforming privacy law carried out by the European Union.
Considering only the most recent proposal (T-PD, 2012c), the main sug-
gestions include the need to extend the protection to legal persons, to add
some exceptions for social networks (art. 3), an a priori verification of the
compatibility of domestic law with the convention (art. 4), and explicit con-
sent (art. 5). Also, art. 8 explicitly denies the “right to be forgotten”, as-
suming that the already-existing safeguards about the length of the storage
and the correction or deletion of inaccurate data already provide sufficient
protection.
3.2 Various approaches to a privacy law
While the Council of Europe was paving the road to a uniform legislation,
during the same round of years several countries were moving their own first
steps in privacy law (Franceschelli, 1998b, pp. 8–10).
3.2. Various approaches to a privacy law 
As is often the case, the United States opened up the way. The Privacy
Act (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974) is dated 1974, December 31st. The
focus of the Privacy Act is to give the individual a right of access (art. 3),
allowing the person to know the data collected about him or her by public
administrations. Such data can only be disclosed under the person’s explicit
consent (save for a closed – but large – set of exceptions), and the individual
must be notified about third-party requests to access those data. Violations
give the individual a right to damages.
Sweden was the first European country to have a privacy law, in 1973,
May 11th, n. 289 (Datalag) (Ministry of Justice L6, 1973). This law allows
personal data banks to be created only with the authorization of a public
authority, and every citizen can access his or her own data.
Portugal is the first state to expressedly raise privacy among the constitu-
tion-protected rights. Art. 35 (“Utilização da informática”) of the 1976’s
Constitution (Assembleia Constituinte, 1976) gives all citizens the right to
access their own personal data in databases, and to request corrections and
updates to inaccurate or outdated information.
Germany followed. In some sense, Germany also preceded the United
States, since two Länder, Hesse and Bavaria, published their own privacy
law (Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz (Landtag, 1970) and Bayerisches Daten-
schutzgesetz ) in December 1970. The German federal law (Datenschutzge-
setz ) (Bundestag, 1977) came in 1977, January 27th. The purpose of the
federal law was to protect citizens against abuse in collecting, processing,
editing or erasing data. The federal law was generic and was followed by
laws of the Länder implementing it.
Following the Safari debacle (summarized in section 2.5), France pub-
lished its own privacy law in 1978, January 6th, n. 78-17: Loi relative à
l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (Parlement, 1978). Among other
things, art. 1 states that information technology is supposed not to hurt the
private and public life of citizens.
More generically, Austria’s privacy law of 1978, October 18th (Österre-
ichisches Parlament, 1978) states a right to privacy of personal data, espe-
cially those data regarding private and family life.
Apparently, Spain did not accept to remain behind its neighbour with
respect to constitutional protection of privacy, and art. 18 of 1978’s Constitu-
tion (Constituent Cortes, 1978) is a statutory reserve for privacy regulations
to protect citizens’ honor and personal and family life. The law (art. 105)
will have to include citizens’ access to databases.
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UK had its Data Protection Act in 1984 (Parliament, 1984), July 12th,
following many of the principles expressed in CoE’s convention 108 (sec-
tion 3.1): data must be collected for special purposes and be used only for
those, updated and corrected if needed, and held for the necessary duration.
When the EU directive on privacy came, in October 1995, the only states
lacking a domestic privacy law were Italy and Greece.
3.3 The European directive 95/46/EC
Not only the Council of Europe moved some steps toward a uniform pri-
vacy legislation. After many EU members had created their own privacy
laws, attempts were made by the European Union to have some common
guidelines (Buttarelli, 1997, pp. 38–71). After all, CoE had stated the ba-
sic principles: right to access, correctness and fairness of data, duration of
the storage and so on. Each country’s law had implemented some of these
principles at various degrees.
In 1990, the EU Commission proposed a directive towards a greater pro-
tection of individuals’ privacy (European Commission, 1990). With the free
circulation of wares being a major interest in EU’s purposes, and since the
information flow is key to commerce, the Commission exposed the need to
thoroughly protect data. Therefore, the proposal was meant not only to
introduce some principles, but also to harmonize some parts of the subject.
The initial proposal, despite being ambitious in its purposes, was focused
more on the information flow than on the fundamental rights of individuals,
leaving the balance of interests to be established by the implementing coun-
tries. The 1990’s proposal had some weaknesses in the distinction between
the private and public sector, in sensitive data, in the tie between the rights
and the location of the database. The proposal never ended in a directive,
but launched strong discussions which were followed, in 1992, by a renewed
proposal (European Commission, 1992).
The modified proposal expanded many points of the original one, such as
the spectrum of sensitive data, the right of access, an “informed consent” as a
mandatory requirement to collect data, and so on. The discussion continued1,
and in the end the Council of Ministers formalized the final directive in 1995,
October 24th, as directive 95/46/EC.
1The detailed evolution of the directive proposal is displayed at http://ec.europa.
eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=100979.
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The directive enforces a minimal protection of privacy in the States, re-
quiring them to adapt domestic laws to the directive, but underlining (in
whereas n. 9) that the changes the states will apply to their legislation can
only improve and not reduce the existing protection, and the resulting differ-
ences could affect data flows both within the State and through the Union.
It is worth noting that the main focus of the directive is not the protection
of personal data in itself. Rather, the promotion of the main objectives of
the European Community, such as the free movement of goods and people,
would require that personal data could circulate freely across Europe, and for
this reason they needed to be guaranteed an adequate protection. The scope
of the directive is limited to this, and it would be wrong to interpret the
protection of personal data it offers without any connection to commercial
goals. For this reason, the processing of data for social purposes but without
a relationship to the European econonomic system is not covered by the
directive, as explicitly stated in a famous decision by the Court of Justice:
“that directive is intended to regulate the free movement of personal data in
the exercise not only of an economic activity, but also of social activity in
the course of the integration and functioning of the common market” [5].
The principles expressed by the directive build over those previously
stated by CoE. Some exceptions are introduced for public safety and defense,
for personal or domestic use (art. 3), for historical and statistical purposes
(art. 6), and for journalism and art (art. 9). A requirement is that “the data
subject has unambiguously given his consent” (art. 7), with some exceptions
for legal obligations or life safety. The balance of interests is now explicitly
in favor of the rights of the person to which the data refer to (art. 7).
The directive also introduces some limitations with respect to the trans-
mission of data towards non-member States (art. 25, following whereas n. 56,
57 and 59), which might offer a lower degree of protection for the individual.
One of the effects of the directive was to push the slacking States (Greece
and Italy) to adopt their own privacy laws, which in this way happened to
be the first ones compliant with the new EU dispositions.
Another major effect of the directive did not involve the States, but op-
erated at a supranational level. Art. 29 creates a “Working Party on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data”,
also known as Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party2. The Working Party
has several functions related to the application of the directive, including
recommendations, opinions on codes of conduct, and an annual report. On
2http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/workinggroup/index_en.htm.
 Chapter 3. Privacy in legislation
itself, the Working Party has no power of direct action against a violation of
the directive, but must inform the Commission which will then undertake ap-
propriate measures. The tasks of the Working Party are expressed in art. 30
of the directive, and later integrated with art. 15 of directive 2002/58/EC on
electronic communications.
3.4 Follow-ups to the directive
With the European directive published and the States starting to create
their own privacy law in harmony with it, the road to a uniform standard in
privacy protection was paved.
Was it, really?
On one side, the concept of privacy was still far from being clearly de-
fined. The interests involved in privacy are quite in strong contrast, and
a definite balance among them is yet to be reached today. On the other
side, things were made more complicated by the speed at which new tech-
nologies were (and are still) pacing, creating problems unforeseen before and
generating new interests on both sides. Additional problems arose from the
fact that it was generally very easy to circumvent privacy rules by moving
database servers to some location with a very lax legislation, however away
from Europe, so that the database could circumvent the more protective laws
of European countries. And of course, the growth of computers put so many
users into direct contact with the new technologies that it was impossible to
have them all ready to face the technical knowledge required to protect their
own interests.
The aforementioned issues led the Council of Europe to draft a new recom-
mendation (Pascuzzi, 2002, pp. 54–57). The document, published in 1999 as
R (99) 5 (Council of Europe. Committee of Ministers, 1999), had a slightly
unusual content. Being a recommendation, it does not contain enforcible
rules, but rather guidelines which should be followed. Structure-wise, it con-
sists of four parts:
I an introduction, with a brief summary of the guidelines contained
therein;
I a set of recommendations for Internet users. These recommendations
are nothing more than what a sensible Internet user should do, such
as being careful when making an electronic payment, not giving away
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data which are unnecessary for the usage of a service, keeping sensitive
information (such as account numbers) protected, and so on. Whereas
they may simply appear as logical safety rules, still many are not fol-
lowed in a general way as of today. A good attention to these basic
principles may be sufficient to thwart many attempts to violate a user’s
privacy, while a careless behaviour would be enough to thwart many
technological means of safeguarding it. Section II is organized in 13
articles;
I a second set of recommendation for ISPs. Some of these are again
sensible rules, such as using appropriate technologies to protect col-
lected data (art. 1) or inform users about the behaviours that could
be a threat to privacy (art. 3); others are “fair business” rules, such as
clarifying the ISP’s privacy policy (art. 11), or avoiding communication
of data not requested by the law (art. 8). Section III is divided into 14
articles;
I a small set of clarifications. The guidelines in the three articles avoid
circumvention of the recommendation by putting all kinds of Internet
operators on a par with ISPs (art. 1). Additionally, art. 2 emphasizes
associations of users or providers to find solutions and remedies.
Another follow-up came again from the European Union. A new direc-
tive 97/66/EC required the Member States to “ensure an equivalent level of
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right
to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the telecom-
munications sector [. . . ]”. The directive aims at strengthening the provisions
of directive 95/46/EC with rules specifically designed for digital networks.
The nominal reference to ISDN in art. 3 is due to the ephemeral glory that
the protocol was having at that particular time, offering better performances
than regular telephone lines but about to be crushed by incoming new tech-
nologies.
The directive includes, among the others, provisions on security (artt. 4
and 5), calling line identification (art. 8 allows the calling user to prevent it),
and automated marketing calls (which require the recipient’s consent, accord-
ing to art. 12). This directive was later replaced by 2002/58/EC (section 3.5),
which took definite advantage of the new breakthroughs in communication
technology.
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3.5 The European directive on privacy and
electronic communications
A significant step forward in European privacy legislation was given by di-
rective 2002/58/EC (Cassano and Aquino, 2003). This directive, adopted in
2002, July 12th, was built over several bases:
I directive 95/46/EC;
I directive 97/66/EC, that was repealed by this one (as specified in
art. 19);
I the framework directive 2002/21/EC, which establishes a common set-
ting for the European legislation on electronic communications (espe-
cially with respect to definitions);
I and directive 2002/22/EC on users’ right in electronic communication
networks and services.
The current text of the directive is the result of the modifications intro-
duced by directives 2006/24/EC and 2009/136/EC3.
The scope of the directive, expressed in art. 1, is wider than that of
its predecessor. The new directive encompasses all kinds of electronic com-
munications, against the telecommunications mentioned in 97/66/EC. The
extended scope of the directive is not complete, however, since it “does not
include any information conveyed as part of a broadcasting service to the pub-
lic over an electronic communications network except to the extent that the
information can be related to the identifiable subscriber or user receiving the
information” (art. 2). Also, the directive only refers to public networks, thus
not encompassing private networks, which can cover a significant amount of
traffic, especially in business environments.
Art. 5 introduces an interesting principle. Communications and traffic
data must be confidential and cannot be stored without the consent of the
data subject; however, storage is generally allowed within the limit of the
technical requirement to convey the communication without losing its con-
fidentiality. Similar provisions exist in the Italian copyright law (l. 633/41):
a digital protected content can legally be (totally or partially) copied and
stored for the technical purposes of playing it.
3Recently implemented in Italy as d.lgs. May 28, 2012, n. 69.
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Although in general it is hard to tell when the purpose for the processing
of data has expired, art. 6 states that data should be erased after that time.
On the other hand, although some discussion was carried out on the subject,
the text contains no provision on the principle of necessity (or necessity
clause), that would prevent data in excess to those required for the stated
purpose to be collected. Such a clause was instead introduced in the Italian
privacy code, implementing directive 2002/58/EC (section 4.4).
Following the wider scope, some provisions are similar to the previous
ones, but with an extended effect: an example is in art. 13 on unsolicited
automated calls for direct marketing, which has an explicit extension to faxes
and electronic mails. The special rule for e-mails comes from the considera-
tion that the practice of spamming, if left uncontrolled, has a negligible cost
on the spammer and a non-negligible cost for the recipient.
With respect to marketing communications different from calls, faxes and
e-mails, the directive offers Member States the choice between an opt-in and
an opt-out legislation (art. 13). That is, marketing communications are al-
lowed only with the consent of the recipient; but the States may choose
between a law where the consent must be given prior to marketing commu-
nications, as a sort of procedural rule (opt-in), and one where such calls are
not permitted if a user requests not to receive them (opt-out).
The directive pays some attention to cookies, which are a mechanism
used by many web sites storing some bits of information on the client for
future retrieval, to preserve navigation data across different visits to the site.
According to whereas n. 25, cookies used for legitimate purposes should be
allowed only after adequate warnings have been provided to the user. It
should be noted, however, that nowadays many web sites use more advanced
technologies relying on high-level concepts such as sessions, which in turn rely
on cookies. Many modern web sites use cookies sparingly, generally under
several abstraction layers and without such adequate warnings (which, at
the current state of the art, could in the long run heavily hinder the user’s
experience of web sites).
3.6 Proposal for a new legislation
The directive on data protection came out in an environment that is no more.
Although in 1995 the computer-based society was reaching a considerable
size, and a computer-managed world in the upcoming years was foreseeable,
the pace of the changes was so fast that no exact prediction could be made.
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If, on one side, the major breakthrough (the Internet that would connect
all computer systems in the world) was well known by then, other changes
that would come in a few years (social networks, mobile computing, cloud
environments) posed many new challenges to privacy that could not be faced
back in 1995 (Mitrou and Karyda, 2012).
Nowadays, changes have occurred, new needs have emerged, unforeseen
threats have spawned, judges have adapted provisions to cases, laws have
been amended, new rights were born, over and over again. Additionally,
significant modifications in data protection are also starting to operate across
the ocean, changing the structure of the historical birthplace of privacy, in a
way which still differs from Europe, but tries to address some of the requests
of a market not limited to the United States, and a global direction for the
future of data protection can be traced (Mantelero, 2012c). Such an evolution
calls for an update to the principles of data protection, because privacy is
one the the two fields (the other, of course, is copyright law) that suffer
more than others the detrimental effects of the technological change, with
the rights of individuals being eroded by new techniques that still operate
legally until laws are patched. And this update must be carried out in a
cooperation among the States, because the change is global (Cacace, 2007;
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 2004). The fast-paced bend
pushed the supranational institutions to take action and start envisioning a
new shape for data protection laws, something more compliant with the new
environment (which of course is still moving on, making this problem show
up again in the future).
The proposal for a reform of the data protection legislation encompasses
the major stakeholders that took part to its evolution, in particular the Eu-
ropean Union (with a major role of WP29, described in section 3.3) and
the Council of Europe. Work on drafts for the reform started in late 2011
with draft comments expressed by the Council of Europe (Kierkegaard et al.,
2011), about the principles the “new” approach to privacy is supposed to be
based upon; the final objective of CoE is to created a “modern” version of
Convention 108, and while the work is still at an early stage, some criticalities
that need to be addressed have been identified (Greenleaf, 2012). The Eu-
ropean Union followed shortly after (although some preliminary steps dated
back to mid-2009 (European Commission, 2009)), launching the proposal for
a reform, backed up by a set of whitepapers describing the reasons behind this
need and the potential benefits that would derive from it4. The current out-
4The information is based on a press release dated 2012, January 25th. Due to the
amount of attached factsheets and whitepapers, it is impractical to give bibliographi-
cal references for the allegations. The full text of the announcement, with an index
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come of the proposal consists of a regulation (European Commission, 2012b)
and a directive (European Commission, 2012a) (the latter is concerned with
the processing of personal data for the purposes of investigation of criminal
offences). The reform proposal has been submitted to the national Parlia-
ments which have expressed their opinions and concerns about the reform.
There is no doubt that the reform is still far from being completed, and far-
ther yet from being implemented in the member States, but the key points
of the reform are quite clear already (Wong, 2012).
One of the major issues discussed in the reform proposal, both within
CoE and the European Commission, is the so-called “right to be forgotten”.
Personal data in a database gets stored, updated and modified several times;
but at some point the data subject might not need the service anymore,
thus invalidating the purpose the data was collected for in the first time.
But generally, especially regarding Internet services, individuals do not have
an option to remove all their personal data from the database supporting
that service, and the data remains stored indefinitely. This has some side
effects, such as the former user receiving commercial offers from a service
he or she does not use anymore, or those data being traded to partners,
in accordance with the consent the user might have initially given (perhaps
years before). The “right to be forgotten” would be the possibility for the user
to be completely erased from a service, removing all personal data pertaining
to him or her. Such a right could be implemented in an “opt-in” or “opt-out”
form: in the former case, the individual would have to explicitly request to be
erased from the database; in the latter, a possible application would require
the data controller to periodically ask inactive users whether they want their
data to remain stored in the database, and erase those data in case of a
negative answer or in the absence of an answer.
The draft for the data protection reform does not include a general and
inconditional statement of the right to be forgotten, but gets very close to
that. Beyond some conditions (missing data, outdated information, data
collected without the consent of the data subject) under which the individual
can ask to be removed from a database, quite similar to those already existing
since 1995, art. 17 of the draft regulation allows the data subject to be
erased in case he or she withdraws the initial consent. The current provision
about the right to be forgotten is controversial (Sartor, 2012) and not widely
appreciated by member States, with additional criticism from the United
States (Mantelero, 2012b). The major problem concerning the right to be
forgotten revolves around a common practice in modern social media (Web
of all related documents, can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/
data-protection/news/120125_en.htm.
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2.0): contents are shared by users and bounced from one service platform
to many others (Mitrou and Karyda, 2012). It is possible that the final
version of the data protection reform will eventually include some form of
opt-out right to be forgotten, with some exceptions for historical/statistical
and journalistic purposes, and possibly with the anonymization of data to be
removed instead of their erasure.
Another major issue in the reform concerns a strengthening of the data
subject’s consent. Currently, there are many differences in the discipline on
the acquisition of the user’s consent. “Silence is not consent” (Borgesius,
2012). Doubts arise as to whether the consent must be related to the user’s
level of understanding of Internet-based technologies. The Commission was
inquired repeatedly about the interpretation of consent, and the new reform
is an occasion to unify the rules.
Additional innovations will concern the discipline of sensitive data, intro-
ducing the concept of “genetic data” into this category. Also, the reform has a
strong focus on the use of Privacy impact assessment (PIA) techniques, which
is a sort of risk assessment that must be applied when designing a technical
tool that might somehow collect or process personal data (Mantelero, 2012a).
Other controversial issues are the introduction of a general liability on service
providers for content posted by users on their service (Sartor, 2012), and the
processing of health-related personal data for research purposes without the
consent of the data subject (Korff, 2012).
In a technological perspective, the new proposal boosts the use of Privacy
Enhancing Technology (PET) towards new levels. PETs are defined by the
European Commission as “a coherent system of ICT measures that protects
privacy by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnec-
essary and/or undesired processing of personal data, all without losing the
functionality of the information system” (European Commission, 2007). The
previous failure of PETs is due to the fast changes in technology, rapidly mak-
ing any tool obsolete. The step forward would be the “data protection by
design and by default” principle (art. 23 of the proposed regulation), meaning
that the lifecycle of systems involved in the processing of personal data would
require the adoption of PETs from the early stages of development (Mitrou
and Karyda, 2012).
The proposal for a new regulation also includes a provision similar to the
“principle of necessity” as it is expressed in the Italian legislation (detailed in
chapter 5). The proposal (art. 5 of the regulation) addresses the minimisation
of data (in a form similar to that already required by directive 95/46/EC),
stating that “they shall only be processed if, and as long as, the purposes
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could not be fulfilled by processing information that does not involve per-
sonal data”; the principle of necessity is slightly more specific, stating that
information systems must be configured not to use personal data when the
same purposes can be achieved by means of anonymous or statistical data
that allow identification of the data subject only if and when needed.
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Italian laws
Preliminarly, it should be noted that most people refer to d.lgs. 196/03 as
to “the Italian privacy code”, but the term in itself is inaccurate, and does
not address properly the content of the law. Of course, Italy has a lot of
provisions regarding privacy, mostly in the aforementioned decree, but the
relevant laws that implemented the European directives, and their subsequent
modifications, are not focused on privacy. The meaning of privacy remains
the same as it was at its origin, i.e., the right not to be intruded upon in
one’s private life. Because of the evolution of the right to privacy described in
chapter 2, over the decades the term “privacy” has come at an overlap with the
protection of personal data (Bianca, 2007, pp. XX–XXI). For this reason, the
focus those laws revolve around is more properly addressed as “the protection
of individuals against the detrimental effects that can be caused through the
processing of personal data”, as will be explained in the following. Traditional
privacy, as one of the forms of the privacy tort in Prosser’s classification (as
described in section 2.2), is indeed an important aspect of this protection,
and is also covered in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (art. 7). However, what the Italian laws provide is not an organic
approach to the subject of privacy. Of course, referring to the Italian laws
by means of that preposition is a bit preposterous, while the terms “privacy
laws” and “privacy code” offer a convenient way of mentioning the Italian
legislation; for this reason, notwithstanding the slight oversight that can be
caused by the terms, they will be the ones used in the rest of the chapter.
Italian privacy laws followed the same pattern found everywhere else.
Initially, on a case-by-case basis, the first principles in privacy emerged by
judicial courts (section 4.1). Then, some laws here and there started includ-
ing rules specifically meant to protect privacy, but not in an organic vision
of the subject. In the meantime, as the privacy principles were more and
more defined throughout Europe (chapter 3), and pressure was being made
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to enforce those principles in Italy too, the initial law proposals started to
be drafted (section 4.2). But so it goes, Italian legislation tends to a bit
slow unless very strong interests are involved, and the proposals kept being
abandoned after the initial discussions. So it happened that, while all Euro-
pean (and many non-European) countries developed their own privacy laws,
following the principles given by the Council of Europe (section 3.1), Italy,
together with Greece, was the only State lacking its own law in 1995, when
the EU directive was published (section 3.3).
But as much as the privacy law in Italy was delayed with respect to the
rest of Europe, somehow it also anticipated the other States. When the
directive came out, Italy yet had to write a law from scratch and didn’t have
to adapt a preexisting law to the EU guidelines. For this reason, the Italian
privacy law was the first one to comply with the new directive (section 4.3).
And later, when the new EU directive on electronic communication followed,
Italy was again (and surprisingly) very fast in creating a new privacy law
(section 4.4), in time with the directive’s deadline of 2003, October 31st.
4.1 Case law
As always, it began with judges (Pascuzzi, 2002, pp. 38–42; Pardolesi, 2003,
pp. 20–31).
While the United States had started thinking about privacy in the late
19th century, Italy took much longer to realize that there are some interests
related to facts and personal information which individuals want to keep
reserved. The evolution followed the growth of technology, which in the sub-
sequent decades would give a huge upheaval to the discussion about privacy.
Actually, there were some preexisting forms of protection of privacy, but they
were belonging to other disciplines, and more related to privacy as seen as
a branch of property than as a right on its own. So, for example, intru-
sions in a private house has always been sanctioned by the criminal code; the
Constitution protects personal correspondence; and the Italian copyright law
(l. 633/41) offers some protection to a person’s image. Still, no real provi-
sions concerned privacy as a whole, let alone the modern view of privacy as
an individual’s right to control the flow of personal information concerning
him or her. For example, while the law already offered protection to honor
and reputation, no guarantees existed against violations to privacy which did
not cause a damage to such values.
The sitation started to change with judicial decisions. And the evolution
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can be followed very clearly. On 1956, December 22nd, decision n. 4487 by the
Court of Cassation [2] utterly denied the existence of a right to privacy. The
decision ruled a plaintiff against two movies about the singer Enrico Caruso,
which told facts that, despite not being harmful to the singer’s honor and
reputation (such as his poor origins, his alcoholism, an attempted suicide),
were not supposed to be revealed because they harmed his privacy. The
Court ruled in favor of the producers, because, as the tenor’s reputation
wasn’t damaged and no copyright violation had occurred, no extra protection
about the singer’s privacy was due.
Things started to change in the next round of years: on 1963, April 20th,
the Court of Cassation ruled decision n. 990 [1], on a book revealing private
details on the life of Claretta Petacci. The Court appealed to art. 2 of the
Italian Constitution. In the decision, the Court states that the Constitution
does not give birth to “an autonomous right to an undetermined privacy”
(which is supposed to be expressed in law), but still it guarantees to every
individual the right to self-determination in one’s own private life, and that
right must be considered violated if details which are supposed to be confi-
dential are disclosed without the person’s (explicit or implicit) consent. In
other words, there is a violation to a right, but this right is not autonomous
and does not produce specific sanctions, but must be fixed using art. 2043
of the civil code, calculating appropriate damages on a case-by-case basis.
The problem is not solved, because damages is not an efficient solution for
the violation to privacy. On one side, it is not easy to precisely compute
the exact amount of damage, especially due to the difficulties and sudden
changes related to the interpretation of art. 2059 of the civil code; on the
other side, the monetary damages are not an effective satisfaction for the
damaged individual, for whom inhibition would be a more suitable solution.
The breakthrough occurred on 1975, May 27th, when the Court of Cassa-
tion ruled decision n. 2129, also known as the “Soraya case” [3]. The case was
raised by some pictures of Soraya Esfandiari, princess of Persia, taken while
she was in her house flirting with a man. Turning the previous line upside-
down, the Court states that, since Italian laws here and there protect several
aspects of private life, there must necessarily be a more general interest in the
background. In other words, the Court finally states that violations to one’s
privacy not only cause a damage to one’s right to self-determination in his or
her own life, but also harm a specific right which finds its expression in many
rules (and, by the time, also in supranational principles). The Court also
states that the violation occurs even if attained using legitimate means (i.e.,
for example without any intrusion in one’s private apartment), and without
any profit.
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At this point, the road was finally marked. The right to privacy had
found a stable basement in Italian decisions (which in the following would
be aligned to the Soraya case). However, it was still limited to the “right to
be left alone”.
4.2 Proposals
The fact that Italy didn’t have a privacy law for a long time doesn’t mean that
nobody attempted to write one. Following the pressure coming from the rest
of Europe, where the Council of Europe was progressing with its principles
and most States were creating their own privacy laws, on more than one
occasion proposals for an Italian privacy law were made, but did not get far
in the legislative discussion. There were actually six law proposals on the
subject, all in the same round of years (Franceschelli, 1998b, pp. 13–15).
The first one appeared in 1981, proposed by Accame (Camera dei depu-
tati, 1981). The proposal acknowledged the growth of databases using auto-
mated processing tools for personal data, and was meant to offer a protection
of the citizen’s rights against the diffusion of personal data, which was sup-
posed to be carried out in respect of his or her private life. The proposal
only included some general rules for maintaining databases, and most of the
details were meant to be filled out with regulations.
1982 saw a similar proposal, called the “Picano project” (Camera dei
deputati, 1982). The proposal was meant at creating a public registry of
databases, with a centralized control over them guaranteed by an authority
which would have been created. Also in 1982 a law about computer commu-
nications among public administrations was proposed (Camera dei deputati,
1982). The project would again create an authority to control databases
containing personal data.
Three more proposals came in 1984. The first (Camera dei deputati,
1984b) was again a full-fledged proposal to protect the privacy of individu-
als (again regarding the automated processing of personal data - the risks
of a circumvention of privacy rules using manual processing was not being
addressed at the time). The second (Camera dei deputati, 1984c) was more
focused on “information systems” (a term which more or less meant “computer
systems” as a whole) and expected all such system to be registered at the
Ministry of Interior. The third proposal, called “Mirabelli project” (Camera
dei deputati, 1984a) was the most significant one, because it came from the
Minister who set up a commission (led by judge Mirabelli). It contained a
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duty of notification about the existence of every automated (again) database
containing and processing personal information. The notification was due to
a control authority which should watch over the correct application of the
law. The individuals would be provided with a right to access to the infor-
mation pertaining them, to remove illegitimate data and to correct outdated
or incomplete ones.
Whereas the aforementioned initial proposals could only rely on Conven-
tion 108 and the achievements reached by other European countries indepen-
dently of the Convention, subsequent proposals could benefit from the fast-
paced evolution that the CoE had spurred, the same evolution that eventually
led the European Community to start working on a harmonized legislation.
As mentioned in section 3.3, this work began in 1990 with the first proposal
for a directive; the proposal was then amended in 1992, and the directive was
adopted in 1995. During the long process of adoption of the directive, some
countries made their own steps forward. Spain adopted ley organica 5/1992,
de 29 de octubre, de Regulación del Tratamiento Automatizado de los Datos
de Carácter Personal, which was in force until 2000, and whose features
much resembled those of the directive proposal, albeit with some differences
(especially in the cross-border flow of data). The Italian proposals of those
years (Camera dei deputati, 1992c,b) took themselves inspiration from the
European proposal, or in some cases (Camera dei deputati, 1992a) from the
ley organica as well, introducing some technical mechanisms inspired from
that law, and resulting in the proposal of a discipline which would have been
substantially similar to the Spanish one (Comandè, 1993).
4.3 The original privacy law
As mentioned earlier, the title of this section is straightforward, but mislead-
ing. The original Italian law implementing the European directive was not,
as it may appear, a law on privacy. Rather, it was a law that aimed at pro-
tecting individuals from damages caused by the circulation of personal data.
Privacy is indeed involved and plays a major role in the law, but this law
does not have an organic approach to the subject of privacy. There are many
articles dedicated to privacy, but the focus of the law is more closely related
to fairness in the processing of personal data (Mucio, 2005, pp. 25–28).
The law originates from two previous supranational acts: art. 4 of Con-
vention 108, adopted by the Council of Europe in 1981 (section 3.1), and
the European directive 95/46/EC (section 3.3). The law was promulgated
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as l. 1995, December 31st, n. 675, and was accompanied by n. 676, delegat-
ing the Government to adopt additional rules integrating the law. Several
add-ons followed:
I d.lgs. 1997, May 9th, n. 123, containing some corrections to the law;
I d.lgs. 1997, July 28th, n. 255, on notifications of personal data process-
ing;
I d.lgs. 1998, May 8th, n. 135, on economic data;
I d.lgs. 1998, May 13th, n. 171, implementing the European directive
97/66/EC;
I d.lgs. 1998, November 6th, n. 389, on transitional provisions;
I d.lgs. 1999, July 28th, n. 318, on security measures;
I d.lgs. 1999, July 30th, n. 281, on statistical processing.
The main foci the law revolves around are the concepts of processing and
personal data (Franceschelli, 1998b, pp. 17–18), both defined in art. 2. The
former contains a long list of possible operations that can be carried out on
data; the list itself is closed, but it contains enough entries not to leave a lot
of grey room. The latter means any type of information which can be traced
to an identified or identifiable person (physical or legal), thus excluding only
masses of collective data which cannot be associated to individuals.
The law expresses several conditions and requirements for the processing
of personal data. A strong emphasis is posed on the data subject’s consent,
which must be written, free and informed (art. 11). The consent expressed
by this law was on the border between a contractual object and a procedu-
ral rule (Cassano and Aquino, 2003): on one side, it was required for the
processing of personal data, but on the other side it paved the way to acts
of disposition (for example, art. 16 allows the processor to sell data to other
parties, provided they are processed for similar purposes).
Other requirements appear in art. 9, which contains the principles stated
years before in Convention 108: data must be complete, correct and updated,
used for the purpose for which they were collected and maintained for no
longer than its duration, pertinent and not exceeding their purposes. The
last requirement will later increase in relevance and become autonomous, and
will appear in an extended and formalized version in art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03
as the principle of necessity (section 4.4).
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A major feature in the law is the creation, in Chapter VII of the law,
of the Guarantor for the protection of personal data1. The Guarantor is
an entity similar to Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with
regard to the Processing of Personal Data (WP29) (section 3.3), but with
more specific functions and more direct powers (and a more limited scope,
of course). The functions of the Guarantor are outlined in art. 31, and
include, among others, maintaining a registry of processings, promoting and
verifying codes of conduct, and publishing an annual report on its activity.
All processings (with a lot of significant exceptions, e.g., for legal obligations,
statistical purposes, journalism) that might potentially harm the rights and
freedom of data subjects must be notified to the Guarantor (art. 7).
4.4 The new privacy code
It was not long before Italy replaced its first (and much delayed) privacy
law with a new one. The need arose out of two kinds of changes: those in
the social and technological environment, and those in supranational legisla-
tion. From the former point of view, the changes were obvious: l. 675/96, as
efficient it may have been, had come more or less when the Internet-based
technologies were beginning to be available to the majority of individuals, so
they still had to produce their full impact on social habits, business models
and so on. From the latter point of view, 2002 saw the production of the
European directive regarding electronic communications (section 3.5), with
major implications involving privacy. While l. 675/96 provided a good, or-
ganic basis for legislation on the protection of personal data, it had already
been modified several times, and many provisions on privacy existed here
and there outside that law. Instead of adding a new law to integrate the
existing one, the solution used by Italy was to replace it, reorganizing exist-
ing provisions into a full, systematic approach to the subject. Thus the new
(and currently in force) law, d.lgs. 2003, June 30th, n. 196 became effective
starting 2004, January 1st (Del Ninno, 2006).
The law is commonly known as the “privacy code”, and again this defini-
tion is inaccurate. The aim of the law is stated in art. 1, which peremptori-
ously declares that everybody has a right to the protection of his or her own
personal data. This principle is much more general than privacy. Privacy is
the right to be protected against intrusions in one’s own private life, and this
is already a concept that, differently from what happened at its origins, is
1http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/navig/jsp/index.jsp.
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no longer conceived as physical, as something related to property rights, but
with a much greater attention to the individual’s fundamental rights; it is a
wide concept and certainly the first and most prominent in the protection of
personal data. But the law encompasses more than that. This is explained
in further detail in art. 2, which states that the law guarantees that tre pro-
cessing of personal data is carried out in accordance with the fundamental
rights and the dignity of the data subject.
The law is divided into three parts:
part I ends with art. 45 and contains general provisions for any situation
in which personal data are to be subject to processing by private of
public entities;
part II ranges in artt. 46–140 and contains rules for the processing of per-
sonal data in several specific sectors, carried out by public institutions,
and regarding particular types of data;
part III is contained in artt. 141–186 and contains judicial remedies and
sanctions for misbehaviours in the processing of personal data.
The scope of the present study only covers the first part of the law.
Art. 3 introduces the “principle of necessity” in the processing of personal
data: databases and softwares should minimize the amount of data processed,
and avoid using personal data when their objectives can be achieved, for
example, using anonymous data. This is an extension of the previous rule
(art. 9 of l. 675/96) requiring that the data are “pertinent and not exceeding”
their objectives. This principle will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
Most of the terms used in the privacy code, whose glossary is in art. 4,
come either from the previous law, or from the European directive on elec-
tronic communications. Thus there are the data controller and the data
processor, representing the (physical or legal) person organizing the process-
ing of personal data and the (physical) person who actually operates on the
data (and must be specifically assigned to this task by the data controller),
respectively. The notion of processing of personal data is even wider than
the previous one, since it now also encompasses the mere consultation of the
database, which was not included in the yet long list of art. 2 of l. 675/96.
Sensitive data and judicial data are now included in the glossary as au-
tonomous terms.
The base structure of the law remains more or less the same as the previ-
ous one, but with some significant changes. One of the major changes involves
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the notification of a database for processing personal data to the Guaran-
tor. The previous law required that any database was within the scope of
the law with respect to notification, with some exceptions depending on the
type of data, the objective of the processing, or the data controller. The
new provisions have the opposite approach (art. 37): the notification is not
required as a general rule, but there are some exceptions (for example when
sensitive data are involved, or for hiring purposes) where the notification is
still mandatory. Also, the notification has been simplified and can only be
sent telematically.
The consent rule is still at the heart of the law, but it has changed some-
what. First off, the consent must follow an information of the data subject.
The information does not require any particular form, for example it can be
displayed on a web site, but some form of information about the processing
of personal data is always required. The only exceptions to this rule must be
individually approved by the Guarantor upon request, in those cases where
major difficulties involve the information of the data subject. The consent
of the data subject is also simplified, and does not require specific forms.
Therefore the consent can be expressed verbally, but must always be explicit
(the consent can never be presumed) and informed (that is, it must be given
by the data subject after he or she has received the appropriate information).
Again, there are special rules that may strengthen or loosen the requirement
of the data subject’s consent:
I the processing of sensitive data requires a written consent, and follows
additional rules, called the Guarantor’s General Authorizations;
I the processing of judicial data must be individually authorized by a law
or approved by the Guarantor;
I data may be processed for personal purposes without any consent, pro-
vided they are not communicated or diffused systematically;
I no consent is required to protect the safety or life of the data subject
or other people, for statistical purposes, and so on. These exceptions
are similar to the ones already present in l. 675/96.
The rights of the data subject are also almost unchanged with respect to
the preexisting law. The data subject can be informed about the existence of
personal data about him or her. The right of opposition is still present, but,
once the consent has been given, the opposition is valid only for legitimate
reasons (while no specific reasons are required to prevent the processing of
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personal data for the purpose of marketing communications). The data sub-
ject can, in general, request the correction or update of data. In general, no
specific formalities are needed, and even a verbal request to the data proces-
sor is sufficient. However, there are some situations in which no such rights
are granted to the data subjects: these exclusions involve specific criminal
laws or economical politics. Data must be deleted after their purpose has
expired, or transferred to another entity for future processing, provided the
purposes are analogous to those for which the user has given his consent.
Even if the data controller sticks to all the requirements, and the data
are collected, stored, processed, transmitted and diffused fairly and under
the data subject’s informed consent, the protection of the data subject is
thwarted if a malicious user gains access to those data. The data controller
must therefore ensure that those data are safe. Of course, it is impossible
to guarantee a total protection against malicious attacks; but the data are
supposed to be protected in such a way that a malicious user successfully
gaining access to the data would be an event beyond the capabilities of
the data controller of reasonably preventing it. Similar problems arise with
respect to the accidental loss or modification of data. The law therefore
introduces some provisions to guarantee the security of personal data.
There are two levels of security measures requested by the law: adequate
and minimal. Adequate measures (art. 31) are those that would be needed to
minimize the chance of data loss, unauthorized access or unallowed process-
ing. Such measures are to be considered adequate based on the parameters
of the available technology, the type of the data and the peculiarities of the
specific processing. However, independently of the above parameters, a min-
imum level of protection is mandatory (art. 33). Further provisions detail
such minimal requirements: authentication, use of encryption for sensitive
data, backup copies, software updates, and so on. The full list of the minimal
security requirements is the subject of Annex B of the law.
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The principle of necessity
It is not unusual, in the field of law, that some concept or right starts being
taken into account as part of some wider rule (for example, art. 2 of the
Italian Constitution is well suited for the creation of new rights), and then,
over time, it begins to grow in importance, and at some point it becomes
autonomous, deserving its own regulations in law or even in Constitutions.
Privacy as a whole followed this very path: born in the folds of property
rights, it grew up and tore itself out of that cradle, not only because it had
become of primary importance, but also because it was clear that the walls
of property rights were not suited for accommodating all the implications of
privacy.
But this phenomenon does not occur only on a macroscopic scale. Some-
times a very small and minor rule hatches within the boundaries of a larger-
scope law, and in time it obtains an autonomous formulation within that
same law. The principle of necessity is an example of this evolution. It
started to be stated on some cases, then it obtained its own dignity with
autonomous provisions.
What is unusual about the principle of necessity is that it grew to individ-
ual provisions in Italy and not in the European Union. Unusual because Italy
has come very late to regulations on privacy, but in the end it appeared to
be ahead of many other countries, and on this issue even ahead of the Union
itself. This is not to say that the principle does not receive any consideration
in European directives, only that it has no dedicated provisions so far.
Generally, the drivers of this change are literature and case law. The
principle of necessity makes no exception to this. There were several decisions
by the Guarantor before it was considered important enough to become the
subject of art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03.
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5.1 Birth and evolution
In older days, when processing data was a mostly manual, it was obviously a
taxing activity. Data processing required a substantially long time and was
fairly error-prone. In such a scenario, it was clear that the more the data to be
processed, the longer the time required and the chance of mistakes, because
it was a cost which ultimately fell on the data controller (an expression from
a more modern terminology), so it was reasonable to maintain processed data
at a low, if not a minimum. Today, the situation has turned upside-down.
Processing of data is essentially cheap, and a greater amount of data does not
really have an impact on the costs of the operations, so the trend is moving
toward the collection of excessive amounts of data, which might not even be
used or processed afterwards.
The aim of the principle of necessity is to counter this trend. There is
no cost for the data controller in collecting additional data, but there is an
added cost on the data subjects, and this cost is the amount of information
disclosed. Art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03 states that softwares and information system
are to process a minimum amount of personal data, and to avoid using them
when the same objectives can be reached via the use of anonymous and
unidentifiable data. In short, the principle of necessity (which in the English
version - when present - of the documents issued by the Guarantor is often
referred to as “data minimisation”) aims at anticipating the resolution of
problems which might lead to controversies requiring the intervention of the
Guarantor and the application of the privacy code (Buttarelli, 2007).
The father of the provision is art. 9 of l. 675/96. According to some
sources (Niger, 2006, p. 121; Parisi, 2006, p. 95), the provision integrates
and completes the previous one. Actually, the scope of the rule is slightly
different, as described in section 5.2. But certainly the two articles have a lot
in common, since both have consequences on the amount of data collected.
Art. 9 of l. 675/96 is a rule with a more general application, because refers
to all types of data processing, while the principle of necessity in the Ital-
ian privacy code applies only to softwares and information systems. Also,
the former is a generic rule which highlights the requirements for the lawful-
ness of collected data, while the latter is a procedural regulation. Art. 9 of
l. 675/96, among the other requirements, states that data must not exceed
those needed for the purposes of the processing. Art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03, on
the other hand, requires that softwares and information systems be config-
ured to minimize the amount of personal data processed. Obviously, despite
a lot of differences between the two provisions, there is a consistent overlap-
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ping over data collected and processed using automated methodologies: the
principle of necessity operates on a fraction of the scope of art. 9 of l. 675/96,
providing stricter rules within that fraction.
The Italian privacy code, however, is the combination of the previous law
on data protection and several other regulations, notably the European di-
rective on electronic communications (2002/58/EC, described in section 3.5).
That directive does not include a strict formulation of the principle of neces-
sity, but nevertheless it states the importance of the matter. Whereas n. 30
states that “systems [. . . ] should be designed to limit the amount of personal
data necessary to a strict minimum”. Even more closely, whereas n. 9 estab-
lishes “the objectives of minimising the processing of personal data and of
using anonymous or pseudonymous data where possible”. However, the pro-
visions of the directive seem to forget those considerations, and apart from
some rules about location data in art. 9, there is no mention of something
similar to the principle of necessity.
The Guarantor had a primary role in enforcing and marking the borders
of art. 9 of l. 675/96, with respect to the rule of non-excess of data pro-
cessed (Attanasio, 2004, p. 54). Before the new privacy code was written,
there were some decisions on the amount of data processed, especially with
respect to publications on newspapers [7; 9].
5.2 Scope and content
The principle of necessity is a significant riddle in the field of privacy, at least
from the perspective of the data subject. The principle is a very important
one in the privacy law: it is placed at art. 3, meaning it is one of the “top
principles”, those that must be abided by from the beginning of the data
processing lifecycle and must pervade the processing of personal data at all
times (although it mainly operates in the stages before the actual processing,
namely the development, deployment and setting up of the data processing
technologies) (Buttarelli, 2007). Beyond this higher placement, however, in
its essence the principle is just one among the many means of protecting the
data subject in the privacy code. But whereas some of these instruments are
very clear, the principle of necessity is much more problematic. For example,
it is easy for the data subject to know whether he or she has been correctly
informed about the processing of his or her personal data, or to know when
the consent is given and when it isn’t. Likewise, an informed data subject
can easily inquire about a processing of his or her personal data, or contact
the Guarantor for violations of the code.
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The principle of necessity, however, is not a means that is easily exploited
by the data subject. The content of the principle, in short, is that identifiable
personal data should not be used when the purpose of the processing can be
chased using anonymous information. But, apart from some blatant viola-
tions (e.g., hotel reservation softwares requesting the name of the parents of
the recipient of the reservation), it is very unlikely that the data subject be
able to tell when the objectives of the data controller can be attained with
anonymous statistical data and when they can’t. This is generally a test that
must be performed a posteriori, probably by the Guarantor after some po-
tential abuse has been notified. But again, even notifying a potential abuse
to the Guarantor would generally be uncertain at best.
There is another principle belonging to the field of privacy law, one with
which the principle of necessity is not to be confounded, the so-called prin-
ciple of purpose (Piraino, 2006, pp. 859–860). This principle predates that
of necessity by several years, and has long since been positively introduced
in European directives. The principle of purpose states that personal data
collected must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes” of the processing (art. 6 of directive 95/46/EC): in other words,
data which are not necessary to the purposes of the processing should not be
collected.
The principle of necessity certainly has a relationship with that of pur-
pose, but it represents a stricter rule on a narrower scope. First and foremost,
it only applies to information systems and software, whereas the principle of
purpose is more general and applies to all types of data processing (not that
this is much of a difference anymore in practice, since today it is quite hard
to imagine data bases not supported by a software backend). But the real
difference between the two rules is in their effect (Piraino, 2006, p. 860). The
principle of purpose, along with the requirements of pertinence, completeness
and non-excess, is a constraint for the collection of personal data, because it
delimits the type and amount of data that can be legitimately collected. The
principle of necessity operates at a different level: it is a boundary for the
usability of legally-collected data. The two principles mingle and operate as
a complex rule that affects the whole chain of data processing.
There is some debate as to whether the principle of necessity is linked
to art. 15. The latter states that liability occurs upon violations of art. 11,
which contains general rules for the lawfulness of the processing of personal
data. Art. 3 is one such rule, but there is no explicit relationship with art. 11.
The point, therefore, is: does liability occur as per art. 15 when the principle
of necessity is not followed? According to some early sources, the absence
of an explicit reference implies that liability does not emerge automatically
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from a violation of the principle of necessity, and this is a missed chance on
the privacy code’s part (Atelli, 2003). Others maintain that the principle
of necessity is a lawfulness requirement and as such belongs to the contents
of art. 11, and therefore the violation of art. 3 directly incurs in liability as
per art. 15 (Piraino, 2006, p. 859). Others still are somewhere in the middle,
stating that there is no explicit connection between art. 3 and art. 11, but the
latter requires data not to exceed the purposes for which they are processed,
and a violation of art. 3 would fall under a violation of that rule, causing
liability as per art. 15 (Sica and Stanzione, 2004, p. 14).
The content of the principle of necessity is twofold: its implications are
both commercial and organizational (Del Ninno, 2006, p. 24). On one side,
the potential data subject, at the time of selecting a product or a service, will
have an interest in knowing what the privacy conditions are, what personal
data will be processed and for what purposes. On the other side, the prin-
ciple requires all operators involved in the field of personal data processing
(both data controllers and processors, but also the whole chain of deploy-
ment, including software developers, system administrators and so on) to
take care that the principle is complied with, and that services are properly
collecting only the required data. Also, in this latter perspective the princi-
ple again operates from two different points of view, since it both affects the
organization of the data collection as a whole, and every individual operation
in which personal data are processed (Mucio, 2005, p. 31). All stakehold-
ers should benefit from the application of the principle: on one side, the
data subjects will know that their data is processed in a legitimate way and
only for those purposes he or she agreed upon; on the other side, the service
toolchain (providers, hardware and software developers, system administra-
tors and configurators) can benefit from an added trust the individuals will
have in their work. The principle of necessity is supposed to work as the
basis of PETs (Buttarelli, 2007).
Since it involves all the links of the data processing chain, the principle
acts as a twofold lawfulness requirement: a lawfulness requirement for the
development, deployment and sale of softwares and information systems, and
a lawfulness requirement for the processing activity (Piraino, 2006, p. 861).
The implication of this is significant: the protection of the data subject’s
privacy starts from the collection of personal data, and not from the decisions
that those data can be based upon. In other words, the mere collection of
personal data is per se an activity that can be prejudicial to the data subject,
regardless of the fact that those data are later used in decisional processes.
Structure-wise, according to the three-step German model (Resta, 2004)
the principle of necessity is part of a rule of proportionality (Verhältnis-
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mäßigkeit). The three steps of the proportionality are suitability, necessity
and weighting. In this model, the check on necessity (Notwendigkeit or Er-
forderlichkeit) implies verifying that something is neither avoidable nor re-
placeable.
5.3 Effects of the principle
The principle of necessity has a relevance in itself, and from many points of
view it is clear and self-explanatory. It is a general rule that all operators
involved in the business chain involving personal data must attend to, be
they data controllers or processors, software developers, system or network
administrators, or providers of third-party services exchanging personal data
with these subjects. Whenever the purpose of the data processing can be
pursued without making use of personal data, anonymous information should
be used in their place, or at least information that can allow to identify the
data subject only when strictly necessary.
However, beyond the general rule, there are several specifications, be they
explicit or not; rules that are influenced by the principle of necessity, and
whose application should keep it in mind. First and foremost, the principle
has a strong impact on the security measures to be used on databases. The
privacy code has a lot of attention on security measures. Some articles in
the law (artt. 31–36) are devoted to general rules about the minimal security
measures that must be adopted in order for the processing to be legitimate,
and the recommended ones that can protect the data controller and data
processors from liability for the accidental loss, modification, or abuse of the
collected data. But especially the whole Annex B contains a detailed speci-
fication of those security measures, with a long list of technical requirements
for automated computer-based processing, additional provisions for sensitive
or judicial data, and some organizational rules (artt. 27–29) for processing
data without the aid of computer systems.
Clearly, a much better protection of personal data can be achieved if those
data are kept at a minimum or are not subject to immediate association with
the data subject. An immediate example are personal accounts on many
authentication-based services on the Internet (such as forums or vendors):
in many cases, the information stored about the service users can be used
to partially identify the user (for example, finding the Internet address of a
given user at a given time), but this is not sufficient per se to identify the
physical person associated with that user. If the situation requires it (e.g.,
in the case of a criminal offense), another subject (the user’s ISP) can be
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requested to disclose the information needed to identify the person who was
using that address at the time. Payment systems work in a similar way,
because they store credit card data of their users, but only the credit card
issuer has enough information to associate the credit card to its individual
holder.
A good deal of the risks involved in the processing of personal data can be
reduced by minimizing that amount of data. Following the example above,
the credit card issuer is expected to have very high standards for the security
of its data (special provisions and codes of conduct are required for operators
in the financial systems). Of course, payment services are not exempt from
having adequate security measures to protect unwanted abuse of users’ credit
cards, but if they were to be able to identify every card holder, they would
have to meet the same standards as the credit card issuers. Simply put, less
data stored means less data to protect.
There are many fields in which the principle of necessity has been the
subject of decisions by courts, or more often by the Guarantor. First off, all
seven general authorizations issued by the Guarantor explicitly invoke the
principle of necessity (Pietrosanti, 2009). Beyond that, there are many ex-
amples (Del Ninno, 2006; Buttarelli, 2007) where decisions of the Guarantor
are (directly or not) supported by the principle. The following sections dis-
cuss some of the most notable fields where the provision has been applied:
employment, video surveillance, people identification, and sensitive data.
5.3.1 Employment
One of the fields where the implications of the principle are most evident is
that of employment. Employers are prohibited by l. 1970, May 20th, n. 300
to use technical means for remote control of employees. However, under
certain conditions in the same law, some tools which have the side effect
of remotely controlling the employees can be installed. The conditions are
rather strict: according to art. 4, the need for such means must be based
upon organizational or production requirements, or for the sake of the job’s
safety; additionally, such tools can be used only in accordance with the labor
unions, or through the intervention of the Inspectorate of Employment.
Normally, the provision is assumed to be applied to tools that are not part
of the job itself. Video surveillance is the typical example of such external
tools which fall under the general prohibition of the law. E-mails and Internet
access, being normally a part of the job in itself, are considered outside the
scope of the provision; case law assumes these tools to be a property of the
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employer, who entrusts them to his employees for the sole purpose of carrying
out their duties. For this reason, according to Italian courts, the employer
is entitled to monitor such tools to avoid behaviours which can harm the
security or are a contractual breach. According to a noteworthy decision by
the Tribunal of Milano on 2002, May 5th [33], the head of an office is allowed
to check an employee’s e-mail when he or she is on vacation to ensure the
job’s perpetuity, and the personality of the e-mail address does not imply
a private access to what is considered a working tool. More in general, the
Court of Cassation states, in decision n. 4746 on 2002, April 3rd [4], that
the prohibition of l. 300/70 operates when the remote control monitors the
working activity, whereas the employer is allowed to use tools to prevent
illegal behaviours on the employee’s part. However, the Guarantor (press
release on 1999, July 7th) considers these tools to be covered under the wider
protection of the personal correspondence of art. 15 of the Constitution [8].
The same is stated by the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data on 2002, May 29th (Article
29 - Data Protection Working Party, 2002b):
Workers do not abandon their right to privacy and data protec-
tion every morning at the doors of the workplace. They do have a
legitimate expectation of a certain degree of privacy in the work-
place as they develop a significant part of their relationships with
other human beings within the workplace. However, this right
must be balanced with other legitimate rights and interests of the
employer, in particular the employer’s right to run his business
efficiently to a certain extent, and above all, the right to protect
himself from the liability or the harm that workers’ actions may
create. These rights and interests constitute legitimate grounds
that may justify appropriate measures to limit the worker’s right
to privacy. The clearest example of this would be those cases
where the employer is victim of a worker’s criminal offence.
The principle of necessity can not only be a guideline for a correct usage
of monitoring tools, but, if applied to these situations, it can also act as a
balancer between the two contrasting interests, that of the employer to verify
the correct usage of the tools put in the hands of the employees, and that
of the employee to have confidentiality in his correspondence. The principle
of necessity would come in handy to limit the powers of the employer under
ordinary conditions, when he or she would not be allowed to check upon the
employee’s e-mail. In the meantime, a non-invasive monitoring could be used
to verify the general e-mail traffic to and from the business’s e-mail system.
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In the occurrence of something suspicious, such as a number of e-mails to
blacklisted addresses (e.g., officially known to be associated to accounted
criminals, or used for criminal activities), additional precautions could be
deemed necessary to find the specific employees responsible for that traffic,
and possibly even more invasive measures such as monitoring the e-mails’
content.
The Guarantor has a similar position on the use of the Internet in work-
places. In a decision on 2006, February 14th, the Guarantor would admit
a claim by an employee who had received a disciplinary contestation from
his employer due to the unsolicited access to the Internet, which was not re-
quired for his duties, from his workstation during working hours. The claim
upheld that the employer had attached to the contestation a number of facts
including the list of web sites visited by the employer, and this had led to
an unacceptable processing of personal data, including sensitive data such as
those regarding religious beliefs or sexual interests due to the content of the
web sites visited. To the Guarantor, the main reason for admitting the claim
was the lack of the employee’s preemptive consent to this degree of processing
of his personal data. The principle of necessity came into place because of
the absence of the need to access the Internet in the employee’s duties: since
the employee was not allowed anyway to access the Internet, the contesta-
tion could have shown the mere existence of unsolicited accesses, without the
need to list the web sites visited and their contents. Moreso, the processing
of sensitive data would only have been allowed to defend against a harm to
an interest equal or superior to that of the employee in the confidentiality
of such data; and the processing of those data without a preemptive consent
would only be allowed when strictly necessary. None of these conditions were
met by the Guarantor in his decision.
Again regarding employment, the Guarantor issued a decision [14; 15]
against the use of biometrical data (fingerprints in the specific case) used
by a company to monitor the check-ins and check-outs of employees. The
position of the Guarantor was that, despite being the monitoring of the
working times of employees undoubtedly within the employer’s rights, this
control must be achieved through the use of means such as a badge. The
use of biometrical data, although suitable for attaining the same purpose,
does not comply with the principle of necessity. The constant position of
the Guarantor on the processing of biometrical data of employees is that
such processing is allowed under specific circumstances, such as letting only
selected employees access some areas [30], while it is prohibited under more
generic requirements [32].
Still regarding badges, the Guarantor states that when these are used
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to allow customers to identify employers, the information printed on them
should not be in excess to this purpose: for example, a name, or an iden-
tification number that allows to recognize the employer only in case of a
claim.
The Guarantor expressed a position on a schema for a decree for the
creation of a registry of workers exposed to dangerous substances [29]. The
purpose of the registry was to guarantee the health of those categories of
workers. The decree schema allowed a company’s doctor, but not the em-
ployer, to process data pertaining to those workers. The opinion of the
Guarantor integrated the decree schema with words explicitly referring to
art. 3 of the privacy code.
5.3.2 Video surveillance
Video surveillance systems suffer a major influence of the principle of ne-
cessity. A surveillance system represents a constraint on the recipients of
the surveillance, and it should be installed so as to minimize the impact on
people. For example, if the purpose of the video surveillance system is to
detect possible thefts in a store, the equipment used for the surveillance, and
the software used for managing it, should be devised in such a way that it is
not possible to zoom in on the person, who should only be identified person-
ally after detecting a suspicious behaviour. Video surveillance also requires
that data are erased after some time. A video surveillance system that does
not comply with the principle of necessity is not allowed. The Guarantor
has issued several documents, including a general provision on video surveil-
lance [10]: video surveillance should abide by the laws on data protection, in
particular the principle of data minimisation, so that “unnecessary, excessive
and/or redundant applications are to be ruled out”; and “software should be
configured from the start in such a way as not to make use of data relating
to identifiable persons if the purposes of the processing can be achieved by
only using anonymous data”.
Again regarding video surveillance, the Guarantor expressed an opinion
over a law decree on video surveillance in stadiums [21]. In that opinion, the
Guarantor allows the identification of people’s faces, because it was coherent
with the purposes expressed in the decree (public safety after a series of
episodes of violence during sport events).
A field that relates to video surveillance is that of mobile phones. The
Guarantor has expressed a position [22] on their use because most modern
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mobile phones have an integrated camera, which can be used to take pic-
tures or video, and a microphone with which conversations or environmental
sounds can be recorded. For the Guarantor, this is legitimate in normal day-
to-day social life, but could be a threat to privacy if the images and sounds
are distributed, for example by publishing them on a web site. This problem
has grown in importance over the last years, with many episodes of people
(especially, but not limited to, celebrities in the show business) having been
blackmailed over pictures taken in intimate situations, with or without the
knowledge of the subject. The Guarantor suggests both to firms producing
mobile phones and to software developers that phones be provided with some
lights signaling when a phone is recording audio or video.
5.3.3 Identification
The principle of necessity becomes crucial in those areas where it is necessary
to identify an individual to provide him or her with a requested service. In
general, these services associate every client with an identification code, and
are then accessed through this code. The principle of necessity requires that,
unless strictly mandatory, only the code is used, and this becomes imperative
especially when sensitive data are concerned (e.g., health-related data). The
Guarantor has expressed its position, for example, regarding Internet TV,
which can provide user-requested content on demand, through the use of a
“return channel” that sends information back to the provider. The decision
extends to similar services, such as those based on mobile phones or pro-
vided by public administrations for the automated emission of certificates,
especially when sensitive data are involved in the processing. In the docu-
ment [23], the Guarantor insists that those service must not process data in
excess to those strictly required to provide the service, and in addition “the
data reported in the bill should not be excessive compared with the purpose
to be achieved”.
Similarly, a decision (already mentioned in subsection 5.3.2) regarding
video surveillance in stadiums [21] also contain an opinion about the num-
bering of tickets. The Guarantor agrees that the numbering of tickets is an
adequate measure and rules against a stricter identification measure such as
nominative tickets, something that would also require the creation and main-
tenance of large databases containing personal data on hundreds of thousands
of individuals.
A lot of complaints were issued to the Guarantor about the Portfolio of
primary students, a document that was supposed to detail the educational
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courses followed by the student. Since the main reason of the complaints was
the absence, in the law that created the Portfolio (d.lgs. 2004, April 19th,
n. 59), of detailed rules on its form and content, the Guarantor published
some guildlines [17]. Among the others, the guildelines stated that, whenever
the purposes of the Portfolio could be achieved without resorting to personal
data, those were not to be used, replacing them with anonymous data or
data that would allow identification only upon need.
The Guarantor also took some action against the practice, followed by
some hotels, of collecting data about their customers to profile them. In the
decision [26], the Guarantor states that the collection of data is moved by
several purposes, including a rewards program and customer profiling related
to the program. The decision emphasizes the fact that, to comply with the
principle of necessity, the data collected and processed about the customers
for the purposes of the rewards program could be limited to those related to
the sums paid by the customer, and for the profiling the data could only be
stored for one year, according to provisions previously issued in another doc-
ument by the Guarantor [16]. This document rules against the collection of
data in excess to those required for the purposes of releasing and maintaining
loyalty cards, used by many companies to provide some additional services to
customers. The provisions explicitly mention the principle of necessity (“data
minimisation”), adding that in no case the use of sensitive data is compliant
with it.
5.3.4 Sensitive data
It is not unusual that sensitive data are used as an argument to point out
a violation of the principle of necessity. Beginning with the most general
provisions stated by the Guarantor, e.g., the general authorizations on the
processing of judicial data and sensitive data [13; 20], many decisions on sen-
sitive data explicitly invoke the principle of necessity. A significant example
of this can be found in the use of biometrical data. There are several de-
cisions by the Guarantor regarding the use of fingerprints in banks, for the
purposes of accessing the bank [12] or using some services [25]. In the former
case, the Guarantor firmly rules against the use of fingerprints as the sole
method of accessing the bank, because the principle of necessity calls for less
invasive measures than creating a database containing sensitive biometrical
data of all the customers of the bank, “especially if it is only accounted for
by un-specific security requirements”. Fingerprints can be used in the case
of strong risks, but at the condition that there is some alternate way for
the customer to access the bank, and he or she is not prohibited access for
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objecting to the collection of biometrical data. In the latter document, the
Guarantor agrees on the use of smart cards for faster access to some services,
but a centralized database of fingerprints managed by the bank is beyond
the limits of the principle of necessity: rather, the fingerprint could be stored
in the same smart card held by the customer. In a different perspective,
the Guarantor admits the use of biometrical data to protect certain reserved
areas of an airport, to identify the only employees who are allowed access to
those areas [24]. Also, the processing of biometrical data is compliant with
the regulations on air security, and is allowed as long as it is limited to those
data that are necessary to combine the identification of passengers with the
easing of the boarding procedures [31].
Not even the main public administrations are exempt from a strict respect
of the principle of necessity: concerning the processing of data related to the
health of employees and their relatives in the mining sector by the Ministry
of Economic Development, the Guarantor stated [28] that the processing
of such data is not justified by the purpose of analyzing the phenomena of
accidents and occupational diseases, because anonymous data can be used in
their place.
5.3.5 Other applications
Other examples can be found, not fitting into any of the categories mentioned
in the previous sections. In general, it can be said that the Guarantor in-
vokes the principle of necessity in all those situations where computer-based
processing of personal data is involved. This is very common today, and
basically any organizational solution making use of account numbers, smart
cards, or similar identification methods can call for an action involving the
principle of necessity. To this end, the Guarantor has published documents
stating that:
I Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) devices must not contain any
personal data about their bearer, unless strictly necessary, but only
information about the product they are bound to [18];
I garbage collection must not allow the identification of personal data
of the disposer. For this reason, the mandatory use of nominative
labels on garbage bags is not acceptable. RFIDs are allowed only for
the purposes of identifying violators of provisions on differentiation,
but the identification must be allowed only to employees in charge of
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issuing sanctions, and not to those who have access to the content of
the bags [19];
I tickets for mass transit can be provided with a chip. Storing the punch-
ings is not allowed, because it is sufficient to store those data required
to verify the current validity of the ticket [27];
I tributary investigations involve the request and transmission of data
between the tributary courts and the banks. Such information must be
provided abiding to the principle of necessity [11].
Apart from these emblematic specifications, where the principle of ne-
cessity is explicitly referred to in the decisions issued by the Guarantor, in
general it represents a guiding rule which should always be imbued into any
type of processing, adapting it to the individual peculiarities of the purpose
of the processing and the means employed in it. The difficulty arises in the
fact that it is generally hard to say when the same purpose can be achieved
using only anonymous data in the place of personal ones, and even harder to
say which data should actually be removed from a processing because they
are not necessary.
5.4 Across the borders
The large number of decisions by the Guarantor revolving around the prin-
ciple of necessity is the proof that the provision is not only a theoretical
guideline, but rather an actual rule which is applied and enforced by public
institutions. At least, this holds true as long as the recipient of the Guar-
antor’s decision is established within Italy. This implies some limitations to
the effectiveness of the provision.
First off, the recipient is generally the data controller. But the data
controller makes use of technological systems, which include hardware and
software components. In its formulation, the principle would also affect these
components. Now, there are two distinct scenarios that can occur: in one,
the data controller is the developer or commissioner of the software it uses to
collect, store and process data; in the other, the data controller purchases or
somehow adopts pre-existing equipment and sets it up for its own purposes.
Both situations are very common, with the former mostly used in public
administrations. Of course, in the first scenario, the data controller has some
degree of power over the development of the hardware and software that it is
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going to use, and a decision against the controller is implicitly addressed at
the developers as well; the Guarantor, when ruling against a data controller
for a violation of art. 3 of d.lgs. 196/03, can also imply that the original
specifications requested by the data controller were illegitimate from the
point of view of data minimisation, thus calling for a change in the whole data
processing chain. But in the other scenario the power of the data controller
on the development of the equipment is minimal, often limited to the choice
between several different equipments serving the same purpose, and some
ad-hoc adjustment (including configuration) to the hardware and software
before the deployment. In these situations, the developers of the information
systems are not called upon, not even implicitly, by the Guarantor’s decision.
However, this part of the problem has a minor importance. Information
systems can be developed for a multitide of purposes, often broader than
those requested by a specific data controller. As long as the data controller
ensures that the third-party software is properly configured and used so that
the data collected and processed are limited to those actually required for the
stated purpose, the overall toolchain is respectful of the provision of art. 3
and as such not liable for a violation of the principle of necessity.
The real problem comes from the applicability of the principle. The
provision appears in an Italian law, and as such can easily be applied to
any data controller established in Italy. According to art. 5 of the privacy
code, which contains provisions on the applicability of the law, this holds
true for any data controller established in Italy, independently of whether
data are stored within or outside the borders. Additionally, data controllers
established outside the European Union using equipment within Italy are
subject to the law as well, unless the purpose of the processing is solely that
of transferring the data across the Union. Some form of data minimisation
can be found in the European directive (especially in the motivation), so,
even if there is no explicit principle of necessity in the same form as the
one in force in Italy, some degree of applicability can be obtained in foreign
States, as long as they belong to the European Union. The application of
the principle of necessity throughout EU will be even more significant if and
when the proposal for a new regulation is approved, since its current form
includes a provision (data minimisation) which is very similar to art. 3 of the
Italian privacy law.
But what about those data controllers established outside the European
Union? The Internet offers plenty of services coming from abroad; and,
although the largest Internet-based businesses, those serving clients in the
millions or billions, certainly have some establishment within Europe, the
majority of Internet-based services only operate abroad. But while laws are
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hindered by national borders, clients over the Internet are not.
The European Commission has tried to address this problem (Article 29 -
Data Protection Working Party, 2002a). The Commission is worried by the
fact that companies established outside EU and not using any equipment
situated within it are subject to privacy laws from other countries, which
offer the data subject a protection that can be (and in many cases is) weak,
or however lower than the European one.
The aforementioned document tries to work around this problem by ca-
pering over the expression “making use of equipment”. A lot of Internet-based
services, for example, store data on the client’s computer using a cookie; in
the eyes of the Commission, when the client connects from within a member
State, this technical tool “makes use of equipment” stored within the Euro-
pean Union, said equipment being the client’s computer. This implies that
the processing is subject to the European directive, requiring clear notices
about the incoming cookie and the user’s consent before storing it. Apart
from the fact that legislations often point at cookies as a major source of
threat to privacy, while the the Internet has many criticalities which are
far more dangerous than a cookie (e.g., geolocalization and search keyword
tracking), strong questions arise as to the effectiveness of such provisions.
The current proposal for a new regulation (European Commission, 2012b)
addresses the problem in a similar way. Art. 3 of the regulation defines a scope
similar to the document mentioned above: “the processing of personal data
of data subjects residing in the Union by a controller not established in the
Union” (and, of course, a controller or processor in the Union). Technically
speaking, it is unlikely that this approach can provide good results. The
solution attempts at enforcing a European provision against data controllers
not subject to European laws. If any, the effect that this provision can achieve
is to seclude European countries from a service that does not want to become
compatible with the European regulation and could simply deny itself to a
client within the Union (and this is where geolocalization techniques would
become significant).
6
Conclusions
The principle of necessity was born in a harsh world. At the time of its
introduction into the Italian privacy law, the computer society was already
very large and running amuck, and the birth of a guideline on how softwares
and information systems should be built came way too late. Additionally,
the limited territorial scope of the provision was such that its applicability
was limited to localized services and companies.
This is not to say that the rule has little value. As small and insignificant
as the subway of Rome can be when compared to the whole context of the
information society, its systems serve in average almost one million users per
day1. There is a lot of difference between allowing an uncontrolled collec-
tion and processing of the data related to the movements of such a number
of people and limiting it with precise guidelines driven by the principle of
necessity.
But the effect of the rule must not be viewed in the perspective of its
limited scope. The principle had been expressed in approximate terms in the
motivation of the European directive 95/46/EC on data protection; years
later, it was introduced into the Italian privacy code as one of the three
“top principles” governing the processing of personal data; and now it is
going back to the European Union, appearing (albeit with a slightly different
formulation) as one of the lawfulness requirements for data processing in the
proposal for a new regulation. It is uncertain if and when the proposal is
going to be adopted; most likely, in the near future a harmonized revision of
privacy laws can be expected, because the context in which the laws operate
has changed drastically since the original directive was adopted, back in 1995.
Considering that the principle has been hanging in the folds of the European
1Data refer to year 2008. Source: http://mic-ro.com/metro/metrocity.html?city=
Rome.
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legislation for the past seventeen years, the right question appears not to be
if it will be introduced in a harmonized discipline, but when this will happen.
So somehow the provision is growing, along the same line where the data
subjects are beginning to become aware of the threats involved in the diffu-
sion of their personal data. However, so far this growth is still limited in its
territorial scope. The European Union is a much wider scope than Italy, of
course, but still the provision faces two major problems. On one side, the
most important Information and communication technology (ICT) compa-
nies, and therefore the largest databases, those containing data on millions
on individuals, are established in the United States and (mostly) subject to
those laws. On the other, the idea that an ICT company, instead of changing
its organization to comply with European laws, can decide to leave Europe
and establish itself in another country, with a looser legislation, is not novel
at all2.
A principle of necessity (or data minimisation according to the wording
used in the proposal for a new regulation) limited to the territorial scope
of the European Union cannot effectively operate on a large scale. A bet-
ter solution would be an international convention. The Guarantor has been
proposing this solution since 2000 (Rodotà, 2003, pp. 21–22). An instrument
of international harmonization that, unlike CoE’s Convention 108, is not lim-
ited to the subscribers of the ECHR, but open to all States. The convention
should represent a sort of “Internet constitution”, whose creation must be
the result of the dialogue among all stakeholders (users, ISPs, companies,
national authorities).
After all, it can be observed that there are two main fields which have been
dramatically overturned by the Internet: privacy and copyright. And since
the latter has been governed by international conventions for the past century
and more, and can now benefit from a (mostly) harmonized legislation, it
would be obvious that the same should happen for privacy.
There are two main reasons why it isn’t so. First and foremost, copyright
exists well before the Internet. Normally, the first copyright legislation can
be traced back to the Statute of Queen Anne, in 1710’s England. By the
time the Internet was born, there was a consolidated legislation whose differ-
ences between the continental and the English approach were already waning.
2The outstanding case is that of Elaborate Bytes AG, a Swiss company selling a software
capable of circumventing Compact Disc (CD) copy protections. After changes in the Euro-
pean copyright law, a new company called SlySoft Inc. sprang up in Antigua and Barbuda
and bought the software off ElBy. Sample press coverage: http://punto-informatico.
it/371100/PI/Brevi/clonecd-si-trasferisce-ad-antigua.aspx.
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True, the new technologies offered by the information society affected that
model in no small way, but at that point the States were not allowed anymore
to make substantial changes to their internal legislation without resorting to
new international conventions. Which they did, resulting in a different, but
still more or less homogeneous protection for copyright holders and users.
Privacy, on the other hand, was born in a form totally different from what
it is today, and its enlargement to encompass data protection was primarily
due to those very technologies. So, in other words, data protection had to
defend itself against the same sources it was born out of. And since privacy
(in the wide, modern meaning of the term) is still posing new questions and
challenges involving some facets of the concept that hadn’t been envisioned
before, the evolving technologies are still making privacy evolve as well. Any
attempt to harmonize data protection laws requires to freeze the technologi-
cal context at a given time and provide a protection for those aspects of the
rights to privacy that have emerged until then.
The other reason is that the most eminent presence in the ICT scene is
represented by the United States, and they are generally skeptical towards
the adoption of international conventions. Regarding copyright as well, the
United States have joined the Bern convension in 1989, one century after it
was created. There is, actually, a growing influence of emerging countries,
notably China with respect to ICT, but that is still an ecosystem talking to
itself, and currently many softwares and services operating in China (Taiwan
not included) do not cater to international customers. This is going to change
in the future, of course; but for now, primarily, the major partners that
would be involved in an international convention on data protection are the
European Union and the United States. Until the latter can be involved in the
harmonization, any attempt at introducing a provision such as the principle
of necessity would have a limited effect. As already said, the companies doing
the largest deal of data processing in the world are established in the United
States.
Aye, there’s the rub.
Whereas copyright laws exist to protect copyright holders against unau-
thorized use or duplication of protected works by individuals, data protection
laws exist to protect individuals from unauthorized use of their data by com-
panies or institutions. In some way, the two disciplines, while sharing a
common ground (that of being heavily affected by technological changes),
view that ground from two opposite perspectives. Major companies face the
two disciplines differently, depending on whether they are copyright holders
or large-scale data controllers: the former are favored from a strong legisla-
tion in their fields; on the contrary, privacy laws tend to be a hindrance to
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data controllers (although, to some degree, they can still draw some benefit
from the protection offered to the data subject). Metaphorically speaking,
money and power stand on opposite ranks when comparing the two disci-
plines. In short, while there is a strong interest by major copyright holders
to have a uniform restrictive copyright law, large-scale data controllers have
the opposite interest towards a loose legislation which allows them a high
degree of freedom in processing and communicating personal data.
European privacy laws tend to be quite restrictive. The same reasons that
made the European Union mostly deaf to the requests for a stricter, “more-
like-the-United-States” copyright law3 also made it more attentive towards
the protection of personal data. The introduction of the principle of neces-
sity, in Italy first and in the European reform proposal later, is an example
of such a policy. According to it, a data controller is not allowed to collect
and process a generic amount of personal data and later select those that are
actually useful for his or her purposes; rather, the purposes of the processing,
specified preliminarly to acquiring the consent of the data subjects, impose
an a priori limitation on the amount and type of data accessible to the con-
troller. A change in the objectives of the processing (such as an expansion
of a company’s business) would require a new consent by the data subject
to acquire those data that have become necessary but were not initially al-
lowed. The constraints imposed by the principle of necessity have significant
procedural effects on data controllers, while offering the data subject some
guarantee that the processing is compliant with what he or she has agreed
upon.
The “other half of the world”, on the other hand, does not even have a
uniform data protection law within its borders. The loose economical politics
of the United States leave a high degree of freedom concerning personal data,
and decisions are mostly on a case-by-case basis. Some sectoral legislations
have been adopted, for example for bank services, but no general discipline
for data protection exists (while there is a strong judicial tradition regarding
privacy in its strict meaning, still clinging to the classification of the privacy
torts identified by Prosser and described in section 2.2). Clearly, it is unlikely
that a country that keeps tarrying in the adoption of an internal privacy law
can choose to bind itself with a totally different and more restrictive discipline
3Despite some steps in the opposite direction by some member States, notably France
(as described in section 2.5). The European Union has only partially adopted the re-
strictive legislation known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and the
work on the treaty known as Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is several
years late (and might ultimately fail) because of a long-lasting resistance by the Euro-
pean Parliament (press coverage: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/
04/acta-european-parliament-votes-against).
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coming from another continent. Contrarily, if and when the United States
choose to adopt a federal act regarding data protection (some initiatives have
sprung up in the past, albeit with no success), they can most likely benefit
from the long-lasting experience gathered by their counterparts in EU.
For the time being, as long as no harmonization between the European
and American data protection disciplines appears on the horizon, and until
the European reform sees the light, Italian users can still benefit from the
principle of necessity in the form expressed in the national legislation (with
a slightly wider scope than the one in the proposal for a new regulation).
Which, despite its many limitations, is no small thing after all. Most of the
companies operating on a large scale have establishments in some member
State at least, and often in Italy too. This allows the principle of necessity to
be applied to those parts of their business taking place within Italy or with
Italian customers.
And here is where the other problem manifests itself. The principle of
necessity is a guideline that should drive the whole chain of data processing,
with a special attention on the data controller’s part; but the only subject en-
titled to decide over its correct application is the Guarantor. This means that,
for art. 3 to be enforced, there must be an initial complaint to the Guarantor,
after which an investigation must be started. If the results of the Guarantor’s
analysis are not compatible with the provision, only then will some action be
taken. And the complaint itself is normally not issued upon the collection of
an excessive amount of data, but rather upon the consequences of an abuse
in the processing, such as an employee fired for unauthorized use of the email
address provided by his or her employer (subsection 5.3.1). Unless such an
illegitimate behaviour based on undue processing emerges, it is really hard
that the procedure to investigate the violation of the principle of necessity is
ever started.
Summing it up, the principle of necessity is a significant rule surrounded
by several limitations concerning its applicability and enforceability. Never-
theless, Italy has pioneered this facet of data protection, and demonstrated
that despite the difficulties it can achieve meaningful results. All this con-
siderations only take into account the “negative” form of the principle of
necessity, that is, the ability of institutions to take actions when it is vio-
lated. But of course some (if not most) beneficial effects derive from the
“positive” form as well: data controllers (and developers, system adminis-
trators, and so on) striving to comply with the provision and configuring
their own information systems in such a way that, when anonymous data are
eligible for use, personal data are not processed in their place.
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At any rate, the same old rule applies: independently of the legislation
and the provisions contained therein, the best protection for one’s own per-
sonal data can be attained by the data subject in person. The Internet
community is beginning to become aware of the threats to privacy involved
in using online services, but there is still a long way to go. Any time a person
buys an airline ticket or books a hotel, makes a comment on a social network,
purchases something on an auction site, or enters some keywords in a search
engine, some piece of his life is snatched from his or her exclusive knowledge
and stored in some database, where it can queried at a later time, possibly
crossing it with some completely different kind of data released to some other
service, to display some commercial offer the next time he or she visits some
seemingly unrelated web site. Some of these problems can be avoided with
good sense. For more complex ones, some technological solution can come
in handy (for example, most browsers offer a reasonable protection against
undue processing of sensitive data such as credit information), maybe with
some drawbacks (anonymization techniques such as The Onion Ring (TOR)
pose more questions than they answer to4). Where these solutions can’t be
applied, a well-developed legislation, with a good balance of interests, saves
the day.
4TOR is an anonymization network built in such a way that all traffic appears to come
from a single gateway, so it is impossible for external services to identify the real source
of the traffic; however, a malicious gateway can end up collecting more data on the data
subject than any external service would be able to.
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